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Abstract 
Adjusting fixed price contract prices over long periods of performance is vital to 
protect both the government and contractor from market price fluctuations.  This is 
accomplished via an Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clause which currently utilize 
forecasts of producer price indexes (PPI) as a baseline.  There is currently a lack of 
research on if the use of these forecasts as a baseline for calculating EPAs is the best 
alternative.  This research involves determining the validity of using Global Insight (GI) 
forecasts for the purpose of calculating EPAs in fixed price contracts.  Two EPA clauses 
are examined as a case study proxy for what may be occurring on a broader scale DoD 
wide.  The PPI of interest to this research is PPI 336411, which covers the aircraft 
manufacturing industry.  The GI forecasts of PPI 336411 are compared to Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) managed actuals of the index to assess the accuracy as well as the 
Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) derived escalation rates to determine if the 
government is estimating escalation in line with the contractor.  A change point analysis 
is then conducted on the historical values of PPI 336411 to determine if significant 
changes in the dataset are influencing the accuracy of forecasts.  Lastly, a retrospective 
approach to EPA clauses is recommended which utilizes changes in actuals to calculate 
EPAs, as it resulted in a lower mean absolute percent error (MAPE) than the prospective 
approach with respect to actuals.  The outcome of this research is a recommendation that 
the EPA clauses be rewritten to support a retrospective approach to calculating EPAs. 
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A CASE STUDY OF EPA CLAUSES AS THEY APPLY TO FIXED PRICE 
CONTRACTS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Background 
Accurate and reliable cost estimates are critical to successfully budgeting for the 
research and development, procurement, and sustainment efforts of a program’s lifecycle.  
For budgeting purposes, tracking the change in price over time is important for accurate 
estimates.  There are two types of price changes analysts are concerned with: inflation 
and escalation.  Inflation “is an economy-wide increase in the average price level” 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation [OSD 
CAPE], 2017).  The more specific form of cost growth, escalation, is the “changes in the 
price of specific goods and services” (OSD CAPE, 2017).  Because escalation contains a 
component of inflation within it, escalation rates are generally valued over inflation rates 
when the Producer Price Index (PPI), from which the rate is derived, is known.  If an 
incorrect PPI is used, or an inflation rate is used in place of the escalation rate, the 
estimated cost growth will deviate further from the actual cost growth, leading to 
underfunding of contracts. 
 DoD producer price indexes are typically provided over a five-year period called 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).  However, government programs have 
financial requirements that extend beyond this five-year period (OSD CAPE, 2017).  
Therefore, a private firm’s forecast of the specific index is usually utilized.  However, 
even most of these forecasts fall short of the anticipated lifecycle of the program.  The 
responsibility then falls on the analyst to determine the method of extrapolation into the 
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years beyond the forecast that “maximizes the realism and stability of the cost estimate” 
(OSD CAPE, 2017).   
 When projecting a forecasted rate far into the future, it is understood that there is 
going to be fluctuation from the actual escalation rate.  In the environment of a fixed 
price contract, this unrealized Real Price Change (RPC) would become the financial 
burden of the contractor.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 16.104(g) states 
that in ''times of economic uncertainty, contracts extending over a relatively long period 
may require economic price adjustment..." (FAR, 2017).  Historically, Air Force Life 
Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) aircraft and aircraft modifications contracts favor 
longer periods of performance.  Because of this, it is reasonable for the government to 
provide security to the contractor if price escalation exceeds the assumptions made that 
informed the pricing of the fixed-price bid.  As a result, clauses are constructed requiring 
EPAs to be applied to eligible aircraft and aircraft modification contracts. 
 These EPA clauses utilize producer price index PPI336411 Aircraft 
Manufacturing as the benchmark for which eligibility for economic price adjustment is 
measured (McGlothen, 2017).  The index used is indicative of the economic trends of the 
work performed on aircraft and aircraft modification contracts.  Thus, the validity of the 
use of PPI336411 as a benchmark is not in question.  Rather, the issue is with the use of 
current forecasts for that index as the basis for calculating economic price adjustments 
(McGlothen, 2017). 
Currently, AFLCMC utilizes Global Insight Inc.'s forecasts of PPI 336411 to 
estimate future years escalation rates.  However, there appears to be little analysis applied 
to this forecasting, with rates beyond the ten-year forecast consistently being projected at 
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2.4%.  The findings of a study conducted by AFLCMC and the Air Force Cost Analysis 
Agency (AFCAA) from 2002 to 2010 indicated that the “GI forecasts for aerospace price 
indices and employment cost indices appeared to be consistently lower than the price 
growth experienced” (McGlothen, 2017).  Additionally, Global Insight simply takes the 
final year's escalation rate of the forecast and applies it to all future years for a program 
beyond the ten-year forecast, with no variation.  This methodology goes against CAPE 
guidance that states “do not, however, automatically extrapolate the last forecast rate out 
into the indefinite future” (OSD CAPE 2017).  Because of these straight-lined rates, there 
may be a systematic underestimation of price escalation.  It is also believed, based on 
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements, that contractors are accounting for higher escalation in 
their proposals, between 3.5% and 4.7%, than GI is forecasting (McGlothen, 2017).  
Therefore, when current GI forecasts rise above a specified threshold of the baseline 
forecast specified in the EPA clause, the government is responsible for compensating the 
contractor for a price change they may already be assuming in the contract.  
Problem Statement 
Under the EPA clauses examined, when the current year’s forecasted index value 
varies up or down beyond a specified threshold in comparison to a baseline forecasted 
value for the same index then an EPA payment is triggered.  For example, to calculate an 
EPA payment the current projected annual index value is divided by the baseline 
projected annual index value, then that value is multiplied by 100.  If the current index 
forecast is above the baseline forecast by a specified threshold percentage, then a 
payment to the contractor is triggered.  Likewise, if the current index forecast is less than 
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the baseline forecast by a specified percentage threshold then a payment to the 
government is triggered.  Previous studies have found Global Insight forecasts to be 
consistently lower than actual price growth (McGlothen, 2017).  Therefore, using an 
inaccurate Global Insight forecast as the basis of the EPA clause could nearly guarantee 
an EPA payment.  Simultaneously, the contractor may be assuming higher escalation 
within their Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA) documents than the Global 
Insight forecasts.  The problem, therefore, is there may be double-payment of 
contingency allowance for escalation impacts already assumed in the contractor rates.   
The goal of the current study is to investigate two EPA clauses as a case study 
representation of what is potentially happening DoD wide.  A discrepancy of even just a 
fraction of a percent extrapolated across the period of performance of a contract adds up 
to a significant dollar value. If this is true, then there is potentially a large cost avoidance 
to be realized by re-wording the EPA clauses. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this research is to answer the following questions. 
1) What amount is historically obligated for EPA adjustments, and how does this 
compare to the total contract amount? 
2) What is the accuracy of Global Insight forecasts in relation to historically 
observed escalation rates in PPI 336411 Aircraft Manufacturing? 
3)  What are the differences between GI forecasted rates and contractor proposal 
rates as manifested in FPRA documents? 
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4) Where are there significant changes in the historical escalation rates of PPI 
336411 and what do these imply about the validity of forecasting this index? 
5) How does a retrospective EPA clause compare to a prospective EPA clause in 
terms of Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE)? 
6) What modifications are recommended to the current AFLCMC EPA clause?   
 Methodology 
This research first determines the historical cost impact of EPAs.  The research then 
examines the overall accuracy of the GI forecasts as they relate to historical data 
managed by BLS.  The escalation rates of government program offices are then evaluated 
compared to the escalation rates of defense contractors, as they pertain to fixed price 
contracts.  The historical index values are then analyzed to see if attempting to model 
future values is feasible.  There are 6 main sources the data was collected from.  First, the 
EPA payments are determined from the ConData database which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  Second, the Global Insight forecasts are sourced from the AFLCMC cost and 
economics division.  Third, the historical PPI values are sourced from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics website.  Fourth, the FPRA documents are used to collect labor 
escalation rates of defense contractors.  The FPRA documents are obtained from the 
source data of the AFLCMC Cost and Economics Division’s contractor wrap rate 
calculator.  And last, the EPA clauses are provided by AFLCMC Cost and Economics 
Division. 
 The analysis begins with determining what has historically been paid in EPAs 
using the ConData Database.  Next, a comparison of GI forecasts of PPI336411 to 
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historical values of the same index is conducted to verify the accuracy of the forecasts.  
Escalation rates pertaining to direct labor are then extracted from the FPRA documents of 
six contractors and compared to the government forecast of escalation.  Once this 
evidence of what is currently happening is gathered, the validity of modeling future 
values of this index is then determined by conducting a change point analysis on the 
historical values of the index.  The MAPE of a retrospective approach to EPAs is then 
compared to the MAPE of the current prospective approach to EPAs.  The research 
concludes with a recommendation as to how to change the current EPA clauses to better 
reflect what is occurring in the market.   
Scope and Limitations 
 The scope of this research was limited to examining two different EPA clauses.  
Within a contract there are many clauses related to price adjustments, however this 
research only covers the use of economic price adjustments. 
The number of programs examined was limited by the access to relevant EPA 
clauses.  The EPA clauses are often referenced within the contract yet not fully included 
within the document, so access to the EPA clause documents were limited.  
The number of ACAT I aircraft programs analyzed was limited by the availability 
of FPRA data.  The accuracy of the forecasted escalation rate was limited by the 
availability of data points.  Data for PPI336411 dates back only as far as 1985, leaving 
only 33 points of actual data on the index. 
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Thesis Overview 
The following chapter, the literature review, delves deeper into prior and related 
research on this topic of study to identify the gap in the research in economic price 
adjustments.  How the research is conducted is explained in Chapter 3, the methodology 
section of this paper, to ensure the results are analyzed through a valid analytical process.  
Next, the findings of the research are discussed in Chapter 4 as well as the implications of 
these findings and how they impact the DoD as a whole.  Lastly, Chapter 5, the summary 
and recommendations section, discusses the findings and provides recommendations. 
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II. Literature Review 
Background 
Why does the cost to develop, produce and maintain DoD systems increase year by 
year?  Three main interrelated factors contribute to the escalation of prices over time.  The 
first is a decrease in the number of systems ordered per production lot.  Second, in today’s 
rapidly growing economy, constant technological advances lead to more technological 
turnover within programs. And third, like the private sector, the DoD’s expenditures are 
affected by increases in prices and wages (OSD CAPE, 2017).  This research focuses on 
the latter, third reason. 
In the private sector the changing price of goods over time is a known 
phenomenon.  This general change in price of a basket of goods is commonly referred to 
as inflation.  According to this definition, the purchasing power of a dollar will change as 
the inflation rate changes (OSD CAPE, 2017).  In general terms, inflation is used to 
describe a rise in the average price level for an economy at the macro level, however, 
when looking at an economy as a whole, there are thousands of commodities and services 
that constitute price increases in an economy, making the application of inflation more 
complex (OSD CAPE, 2017).  This complexity arises from specific commodities’ and 
services’ prices changing at different rates due to factors such as market shifts, economies 
and diseconomies of scale, or changes to inputs of production (OSD CAPE, 2017).  
Because of this difference in price growth it is necessary to utilize escalation to determine 
the price changes of a specific commodity or service. 
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Transitioning from the private sector to the Department of Defense creates more 
complexity with the comparison of dollars appropriated in a given year, but spent over 
multiple years (OSD CAPE, 2017).  To address this added complexity, program offices 
will utilize escalation rates to compare future year dollars (often referred to as Then-Year 
dollars) to current year dollars (often referred to as Constant Year Dollars).  More detail 
about the derivation of escalation rates is discussed later in this chapter. 
Government Procurement Process and Contracts 
Government procurement is the process by which the government acquires goods 
or services from a contracting entity.  The vessel which allows for legal exchange of 
goods or services is the contract.  Contracts are important because 1. “any trade -- as a 
quid pro quo -- must be mediated by some form of contract”, and 2. “they provide the 
foundation for a large part of economic analysis” (Hart, 1986).  Before a contract is 
awarded there are certain steps that must be taken to ensure a lawful and fair process.  In 
a contract by negotiation the government first submits a Request for Proposal (RFP) to 
the participating bidders.  This RFP outlines the requirements and requests technical and 
pricing information from the seller (US Department of State, 2018).  Proposals are then 
submitted by the sellers and evaluated by the government based on established criteria in 
the RFP.  Once all proposals are evaluated there may be negotiations held to resolve any 
issues arising from proposed hours or material required.  Upon a consensus the contract 
will be awarded based on the criteria the government set in the original RFP. 
Government contracts fall into two general categories, fixed-price and cost-
reimbursement contracts.  Which contract the government chooses to use is dictated by 
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the nature of the product or service they are acquiring.  For instance, when acquiring a 
commercial product or awarding a contract based on a sealed bid, the government must 
use a fixed price contract (DAU, 2017).  Cost-reimbursement contracts are recommended 
when uncertainty in the contract performance does not allow for an accurate estimate of 
cost (DAU, 2017). 
The contract type chosen will determine which party bears the cost risk: the 
government or the contractor.  With a fixed-price contract, cost risk falls on the 
contractor, as they have complete control over the magnitude of their profit or loss, 
making this contract type the most auspicious choice for the government under 
circumstances that favor shifting the risk to the contractor.  From the contractor’s 
perspective, a cost-plus-fixed-fee may be the most beneficial contract when the 
circumstances favor shifting the risk to the government.  This contract type places the 
majority of the cost risk on the government because the profit paid to the contractor is 
fixed regardless of the performance.  There are various other incentive-type contracts that 
fall on a spectrum of assumed risk between these two contract types.  A visual of this 
spectrum can be seen in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Government Contract Spectrum (State Procurement Office, 2018) 
Economic Price Adjustments 
This research focuses on fixed price with EPA contracts. As the name implies, 
fixed price contracts “provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis 
of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract” (FAR, 2017).  The benefit 
of a fixed price contract is that it shifts the cost risk from the government to the 
contractor.  In other words, if the contractor exceeds estimated costs to complete the 
work, the government is not responsible for compensation.  The economic price 
adjustment portion of the contract protects both sides, the government and the contractor, 
of any unforeseen change in the market price of the good or service.  The EPA is based 
on the cost index of labor or material and is utilized when any of the following three 
circumstances are met: 
1. The contract involves an extended period of performance with significant 
costs to be incurred beyond 1 year after performance begins; 
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2. The contract amount subject to adjustment is substantial; and 
3. The economic variables for labor and materials are too unstable to permit a 
reasonable division of risk between the Government and the contractor, 
without this type of clause (FAR, 2017).  
Two EPA clauses are referenced in this research, one for KC-46 lots 3-13 and one for the 
C-5 lots 4-7.  The full clauses are in Appendix A. 
What is the advantage of incorporating an EPA into a fixed price contract?  In a 
case study of petroleum coke conducted in 1987 by Victor P. Goldberg and John R. 
Erickson, the problems of quantity and price adjustments in long term contracts are 
examined as they pertain to the product petroleum coke.  In this investigation two 
potential reasons for using EPAs in long term contracts are concluded. “First, adjusting 
the price to keep it in line with current market prices gives the parties the proper short-run 
price signals” (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987).  This speaks to the importance of indexing 
the price of a good to be commensurate with the market price. In the case of coke, the 
quantity of petroleum coke demanded was a reflection of the refinery’s demand for fuel, 
not for coke (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987).  Therefore, indexing the price of a good to 
the correct input item will have major impacts on the accurate forecasts of short and long-
term price changes.   
The other reason for incorporating EPAs into long-term contracts includes the 
overall reduction of incentive for one or both parties to breach contract terms or behave 
opportunistically (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987).  In a long-term contract both parties 
have an incentive to expend resources to better predict the future costs and prices of 
goods.  Therefore, it is advantageous for both parties to include in their initial agreement 
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an EPA to minimize wasteful spending of valuable resources (Goldberg and Erickson, 
1987).  This case study provides insight into how EPAs are used and why they are used 
within the private sector.  Similarly, the same uses and reasons for use can be applied in a 
government contract setting, as long-term private contracts follow similar principles to 
long-term government contracts. 
A third situation for using EPAs is take-or-pay contracts.  These take-or-pay 
contracts often “link sellers and buyers for a long period, generally 20-25 and even up to 
30 years” (Creti and Villeneuve, 2004).  The drawback of these style contracts is the 
inflexibility of prices with demand and supply fluctuations.  However, this can be 
mitigated by applying clauses that stipulate a floor price and allows for upward 
adjustment following price escalators.  These price escalators are tied to specific price 
indexes (Creti and Villeneuve, 2004).  This is further evidence of the efficacy of applying 
EPA clauses in long-term contracts and linking them to price indexes. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), from which the government obtains 
producer price index (PPI) data, spells out guidelines to follow when creating a clause in 
a contract to account for an EPA.  First, a baseline cost of the end item on contract is 
established with a detailed description of the end item as well as the month and year of 
the established base price.  Second, an appropriate PPI is selected that falls in line closely 
to the product or service on contract.  For the remainder of this paper PPI336411 is the 
focus, which encompasses the price of aircraft manufacturing and is the benchmark 
against which the eligibility for an economic price adjustment is determined.  Third, the 
source of the PPI data is documented clearly.  Fourth, the frequency of the price 
adjustment is specified, typically quarterly, semi-annually, or annually.  Next, both the 
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contractor and the government agree on a specific base and comparison months within 
the price adjustment.  Lastly, the methodology of the price adjustment is then explicitly 
explained (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017).  For the remainder of the paper, the KC-
46 and C-5 EPA clauses pertaining to PPI 336411 is referenced.  
EPAs in Defense Programs 
 FFP contracts on major government programs tend to span long periods into the 
future.  Due to their long periods of performance, these FFPs are eligible to include 
economic price adjustments.  These economic adjustments allow for “upward and 
downward revision of the stated contract price” (FAR, 2017).  These revisions can stem 
from multiple scenarios.  The first being “adjustments based on established prices” (FAR, 
2017).  If a good or service is generally accepted to cost a specific amount less than what 
the contractor established in their proposal, then an EPA may be applied to allow for this 
adjustment.  Second, EPAs can stem from “adjustments based on actual cost of labor or 
material” (FAR, 2017).  If the contractor proposed a specific price of a piece of material 
but the actual cost incurred was less than the proposed amount, then an EPA may be 
applied to the original proposal.  Last, an EPA can come about from “adjustments based 
on cost indexes of labor or material” (FAR, 2017).  These can either be forecasted index 
values or actual values of the index as reflective of the market. 
As previously stated, best practice requires an EPA clause to specify the exact PPI 
used as a basis to track changes in the price of a good or service over time.  BLS 
maintains data on two different price indexes, both used for distinct and different 
purposes.  The first index is the consumer price index, which tracks the change of all 
goods and services purchased by consumers in urban households (US BLS, 2017).  This 
15 
index is relevant as it is the base index for calculating inflation.  Simply stated, the CPI is 
the raw data of the price change and the inflation rate is the calculated percent change of 
price year by year.  The second index BLS tracks is the Producer Price Index (PPI).  PPIs 
differ from the CPI in that it measures the change in price over time in the selling price of 
a good or service from the producer’s perspective, rather than the consumer’s (US BLS, 
2017).  Similar to the CPI in relation to inflation, PPIs are used as a base to calculate 
escalation rates. 
Forecasting Escalation: Current Practice 
Price escalation rates are derived from producer price indexes (PPI), which are 
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to measure the change in the price 
received by a producer for a specific good or service they provide (OSD CAPE, 2017).  
These PPIs are specific to thousands of goods and services and are disaggregated to lower 
levels within each industry. For example, PPI 3364 covers the aerospace product and 
parts manufacturing industry.  Below this industry level PPI is PPI 336411, which tracks 
the price changes of aircraft manufacturing specifically (US BLS, 2017).  Escalation rates 
are calculated by simply finding the percent change in the PPI year-by-year.  This 
research focuses on PPI 336411. 
A corporation called Global Insight creates forecasts for thousands of PPIs which 
the government then uses for contracting purposes.  Not only are accurate escalation rates 
important because there is a clause that requires the government to compensate the 
contractor for inaccurate escalation forecasts, but also because “accurate and reliable 
estimates allow proper expression of life cycle costs, budgeting and program 
16 
requirements...” (Sweitzer, 1997).  It is this accurate forecasting of price escalation that 
allows for proper budgeting and mitigates fees paid to the contractor. 
 If there is a discrepancy, even minor, in the forecasting of price escalation 
between the DoD and contractor, these minor differences could result in the government 
to paying unneeded compensation to the contractor.   While there are limited studies that 
have been conducted on price escalation, there have been studies published on inflation.  
Recall that inflation is defined as “a persistent rise in the prices associated with a basket 
of goods and services that is not offset by increased productivity” (Tayari, 2017). 
Escalation, similarly, is “a persistent rise in the price of specific commodities, goods, or 
services due to a combination of inflation, supply/demand, and other effects such as 
environmental and engineering changes” (Tayari, 2017).  In other words, inflation refers 
to the rise in prices of a general basket of goods or services, while escalation refers to a 
specific good or service.  Due to this similarity it is reasonable to apply lessons learned 
from this study on inflation to research on price escalation. 
  An internal study conducted by AFLCMC/FZC and the Air Force Cost Analysis 
Agency (AFCAA) in 2011 compared the Global Insight forecast for aerospace price 
index PPI 3364 and labor cost indexes to actual growth experienced.  The results show 
that GI forecasts of price escalation are consistently lower than actual growth 
experienced.  These differences “are substantial and become quite severe with 
compounding over several years' time” (McGlothen, 2017).   It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that consistency between GI forecasts, BLS actuals, and contractor forward 
pricing rate agreements is pertinent to the accurate representation of costs for government 
acquisitions programs.  This study, however, can be expanded on with eight more years 
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of data from 2009 to 2017, as well as analyzing PPI 336411 instead of PPI 3364, as PPI 
336411 is the index referenced in the two EPA clauses referred to in this research.  This 
research also expands on this study by examining more government contractors, 
determining the historical cost impact of EPAs, and analyzes the historical data to 
determine if using forecasts as a basis for EPAs is appropriate. 
  Paul Joskow (1987) conducted a study on price adjustments in long term coal 
contracts, which concluded that “some contracts track changes in market values very 
poorly” (Joskow, 1987).  As with Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) program's contracts 
“the vast majority of long-term coal contracts use a base price plus escalation” formula to 
account for uncontrollable price changes (Joskow, 1987).  Joskow explains that fixed 
price contracts that rely on forecast expectations of future costs are bound to have errors 
resulting from poor forecast techniques and inability to accurately predict future cost 
changes. 
To combat these price changes Joskow states that some type of cost-plus contract 
may be utilized.  In a cost-plus contract, a contractor is paid for all of “its allowed 
expenses, typically up to a set limit” and then paid some set amount to account for profit 
(CSIS, 2008).  Joskow essentially states that the amount paid to the contractor in this 
situation is accounting for the economic price increase over time.  However, he then 
states that cost plus contracts provide minimum incentive to the seller to provide 
minimum cost supply.  These cost plus contracts do not accurately account for 
“unanticipated changes in market supply and demand conditions” (Joskow, 1987).  This 
deemphasizing of cost plus contracts is mirrored in the public sector through the passage 
of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) in 2009.  One of the main 
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objectives of WSARA is "to encourage competition to reduce sole-source contracting 
(often cost-plus based) and pave the way for greater use of fixed-price contracting” 
(Wang, 2013).  
Instead of using cost-plus contracts to account for price increases, Joskow argues 
that a “base price plus escalation” type contract is a better alternative (Joskow, 1987).  
This type of contract provides a “base price reflecting supply and demand conditions 
when the contract is signed and which then provides for adjustments in the base price 
using a formula that incorporates a weighted average of exogenous input price indexes 
reflecting” the anticipated change in both raw material and labor costs (Joskow, 1987).  
This is essentially equivalent to the DoD’s usage of a FFP contract with an EPA included, 
as mandated by the FAR for all contracts spanning multiple years that meet the 
requirements of an EPA.  The key to this method being successful at accounting for 
market price changes is the accuracy of the forecasting.  If the market value of the raw 
materials “moves along with the changes in prices...then this method seems superior to a 
cost-plus contract” (Joskow, 1987).  Therefore, the accuracy of the indexes used in the 
forecasting are a key driver in the accuracy of the overall EPA.  
An example of how an EPA clause could have been utilized in the private sector 
to avoid unneeded litigation is spelled out in the 1967 court case of Alcoa v. Essex.  
Alcoa signed a twenty-year contract agreeing to convert Essex’s alumina into molten 
aluminum.  The initial contract was for 50 million pounds of molten aluminum per year 
at a price of 15 cents per pound (Goldberg, 1987).  Fixed costs and ceiling prices were 
established as well, however, in 1973 a large increase in the price of fuel had a major 
effect on the price of aluminum, causing it to increase at a greater rate than what was on 
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contract.  This change in outside economic conditions led to prices originally spelled out 
in the contract to be compromised by Alcoa.  The court ruled in favor of Alcoa because 
they determined both Alcoa and Essex had tracked the Wholesale Price Index poorly, 
leading to the un-anticipated change in fixed prices within the contract (Goldberg, 1987). 
The case of Alcoa v. Essex is a prime example of how a well-defined EPA clause 
could have been utilized.  The contract spelled out an upward allowable price adjustment 
of 65% of the price of a specified type of aluminum (Goldberg, 1987).  Because this 
ceiling price was not tied to an accurately tracked price index, it was impossible to 
predict how the price of aluminum would change.  This case potentially could have been 
avoided if a price index representative of aluminum had been agreed upon by both parties 
and written into an EPA clause that allowed for an upward and downward adjustment of 
the price of aluminum.  If the EPA clause also spelled out an upper and lower minimum 
threshold of price index adjustment for an EPA to be paid to the required party, then 
litigation could have been avoided. 
As discussed earlier, a case study on the petroleum coke industry discussed the 
reasons for utilizing EPAs in long term contracts.  This study found that 90 percent of the 
pre-1973 contracts and all of the post-1973 contracts provided some price flexibility 
(Goldberg and Erickson, 1987).  Indexing a price of a good to the historic market price of 
an input good is one of the mechanisms for incorporating a price adjustment.  This is a 
very similar method to what government contracts do when they write EPA clauses into 
contracts.  A price index is selected that accurately reflects the market price of the end 
item, and then a maximum and minimum threshold is established for allowable changes 
in the forecast of the base index.  This comparison of the private sector to the government 
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sector is important in that it demonstrates there is a precedence set by the private sector in 
creating EPA clauses in these warranted situations.  However, where the government may 
be lacking is in how they go about implementing these EPA clauses. 
The importance of accurate inflation indexes is examined in a paper published by 
the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA).  Inflation indexes differ from escalation indexes 
in that they “cover the entire economy as a whole”, while escalation indexes “cover 
specific classes of goods and services” (Horowitz, 2012).  On the basis of forecasting 
inflation rates beyond the five-year Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it is 
mandated by OMB Circular No. A-94 that the “inflation assumption can be extended by 
using the inflation rate for the sixth year of the budget forecast” (OMB, 1992).  In other 
words, for the purpose of inflation there is essentially no analysis applied to the inflation 
forecast extending beyond five years.  Instead, projects extending beyond five years “are 
advised to use the final year's rate in perpetuity” (OMB, 1992).  This creates a potential 
problem, in that using a single year's rate as a basis for future years may be inaccurate. If 
actual inflation rates grow faster than forecast rates, “programs will be systematically 
underfunded, leading to unnecessarily high real program cost growth” (Horowitz, 2012).  
Thus, it may be more beneficial to apply some other technique to forecast beyond five 
years. 
 As with inflation, the same issues of forecasting accuracy arise for escalation.  As 
examined previously in the study conducted on AFLCMC on the importance of proper 
EPA predictions, the report states that in competitive fixed price contracts with EPA, it is 
reasonable that “historical averages serve as the basis for calculating a fair economic 
price adjustment” (McGlothen, 2017).  This conclusion is backed because historical 
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averages of aerospace indexes used by Global Insight coincide with industry's tendency 
to forecast price growth at 3%. 
Change Point Analysis 
One of the goals of this research is to analyze the historical data of PPI 336411 to 
determine if there are change points that are interfering with the accuracy of GI forecasts.  
Change point analysis is useful in three applications: determining if process 
improvements led to a shift in the data, problem solving, and trend analysis (Gavit, 
Tholmer and Baddour, 2009).  This research focuses on utilizing change point analysis as 
a problem-solving method to determine if trends in the historical data of PPI 336411 are 
leading to unreliable forecasts.  As an example, an article in the BioPharm International 
journal discusses a situation when change point analysis is used as a problem-solving 
technique.  A medical manufacturing facility is having issues with out-of-range results 
for sodium concentration in a processing buffer.  To determine if the out-of-range batches 
are a result of a shift in sodium concentration of the buffer a change point analysis should 
be run on the sodium concentration of the buffer outputs (Gavit, Tholmer and Baddour, 
2009).  This research focuses solely on historical shifts in PPI 336411 values and how 
they may be affecting forecast reliability.  In this situation, the PPI values are the input 
and the GI forecasts are the output. 
This research uses a combination of cumulative sum (CUMSUM) charts and 
bootstrapping to detect changes.  CUMSUM charts “rely on a visual assessment of 
whether there is a change in the slope” (Gavit, Tholmer and Baddour, 2009).  A 
cumulative sum is a running total of the deviation of each individual data point from the 
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average of the data.  Therefore, a CUMSUM chart is just a plot of all the CUMSUMs in 
the data set.  In times when the values tend to be above the average, the CUMSUM chart 
will reflect a positive slope, while in times when the values tend to be below the average, 
the CUMSUM chart will reflect a negative slope.  A change point, therefore, is marked 
by a sudden shift in the slope of the CUMSUM chart and represents a point in time when 
the overall trend of the data suddenly shifted (Taylor, 2000).  These change points create 
irregular shifts in the data that can make it more complex to accurately forecast future 
values.   
There are many forecasting techniques available, however not many are able to 
take into account random noise in the data.  Two methods that do take this into account 
are decomposition and intervention models.  Decomposition models are used to forecast 
time series data by decomposing the data into four different factors: trend, seasonal, 
cyclical, and irregular (Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005).  The irregular piece of 
these models captures the error and erratic behavior that is difficult to predict.  However, 
these models “have no theoretical basis-they are strictly an intuitive approach” 
(Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005).  Likewise, intervention models are used 
“when exceptional external events, called interventions, affect the variable being 
forecasted” (Bowerman, O’Connell and Koeler, 2005).  These models are an iteration of 
Box-Jenkins models and can be very beneficial with data that contains change points.  
However, the issue with these models is not their accuracy, but rather their application as 
a basis in an EPA clause.  Though there is no insight into what exact methods GI utilizes 
to forecast PPI values, the use of any forecast as the basis for calculating EPAs is likely 
to result in unwarranted EPA payments.  When the EPA is based on forecast the accuracy 
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of the forecast is inherently going to have an effect on whether an EPA is triggered and 
what the magnitude is.  If EPAs are based on historical averages of actual PPI values, 
then the forecasting error is taken out of the equation.  This is the difference between a 
prospective and a retrospective EPA clause. 
Evidence to suggest a retrospective EPA clause is a plausible solution is outlined 
in Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARs).  DFARs section PGI 216.203-4 
mandates when EPA clauses should be used, how they should be implemented, and all 
the details on what they should include.  This document essentially spells out exactly how 
to write an EPA clause.  It specifies the clause should be based on an index that is not so 
diverse that it is significantly affected by fluctuations not relevant to contract 
performance, but also not so narrow so as to minimize the effect of any single company 
(DFARS PGI 216.203-4, 2012).  Though it is agreed an EPA clause should be based on 
an appropriate index, DFARS does not specify whether the EPA should be based on 
historical index values or proprietary forecasts of said index.  Therefore, it is up to the 
contracting officer, or whoever is writing the clause, to determine which method is most 
appropriate.   
The expected impact of fixing this escalation issue will vary depending on the 
overall magnitude and length of the contract.  However, “in times of lower price growth, 
as has been experienced over the past 5 years, the result would be money being returned 
to the Air Force for application elsewhere” (McGlothen, 2017).  The current EPA clause 
does stipulate this protection to the government but in practice the clause may not be 
exercised.  Considering the current number of active contracts in the Air Force, “it is 
conceivable that the impact over the next decade could amount to hundreds of millions of 
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dollars of precious obligation authority being spared from improper economic price 
adjustment payment” (McGlothen, 2017). 
Chapter Summary 
There is a current gap in the research regarding escalation forecasting and 
application of FFP contracts with EPAs.  This paper aims to accomplish five goals. First, 
understand what has been historically paid in regards to EPAs.  Second, determine the 
accuracy of Global Insight forecast compared to historic data of PPI336411.  Third, 
identify the quantitative difference between GI forecasted rates and contractor proposal 
rates within the FPRAs.  Fourth, explore the historical data of PPI 336411 for any change 
points.  And last, provide recommendations for changes to the current AFLCMC EPA 
clause.  
The next chapter will discuss the methodology of the research conducted.  Then 
the results and analysis will be detailed in chapter four.  And finally, a summary of the 
research findings will be laid out in chapter five. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter covers the methodologies applied to each research question.  The 
methodologies serve four main objectives.  First, a contract modification database is used 
to identify how many Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) modifications there have been 
and describe the total obligated amounts for those modifications.  Second, Global Insight 
(GI) data is analyzed to determine the accuracy of current Producer Price Index (PPI) 
forecasts compared to historical observations.  Third, GI data as well as Forward Pricing 
Rate Agreements (FPRA) are utilized to identify the difference between GI forecasts of 
PPI data versus what contractors are proposing in the FPRA documents.  Last, a change 
point analysis is conducted on the historical escalation rates of PPI 336411.   
This chapter first discusses the data for each of these objectives.  Next, the data 
sources for each objective are examined, as well as data limitations. Last, the 
methodology for each research question is explained.  
Historical Economic Price Adjustments 
The 2011 AFLCMC study suggested reducing inappropriate EPA obligations could 
lead to hundreds of millions of dollars saved in obligation authority.  To gain an 
understanding of the cost impact these EPAs have had through the years, EPA contract 
modifications from 1981 to 2017 are analyzed to determine how much historically has been 
obligated as related to EPAs. 
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Data and Data Sources  
The data for this research question comes from the ConData database collected by 
AFLCMC’s cost and economics division.  The database contains 46,367 different 
contracts and contract modifications.  They are exported to excel and sorted by a 
multitude of descriptive columns including PIIN order ID (identification number), 
division (airframe), cage number (prime contractor), mod ID, total contract price, 
modification obligation amount, etc.  This data requires normalization to a Constant 
Price.  The term Constant Price (CP) is used when costs are normalized with an 
escalation index (OSD CAPE, 2017).  To accomplish the normalization, the BLS 
managed historical data of PPI 336411 are used to escalate contract obligation amounts to 
CP 2017 dollars.   
 The EPA clauses for the C-5 Reliability Enhancements and Re-Engineering 
Program (RERP) as well as the KC-46 are used as a reference for the entire thesis.  Both 
these establish PPI 336411 as a basis for calculating EPAs. 
Data Limitations 
The ConData database is derived from the Contract Writing System (ConWrite) 
which is the main system utilized for all pre and post-award contract activities and hence 
all contracts are processed through this system (FAR, 2017).  The database contains 
contracts dating back to 1982.  It is clear this database is not inclusive, however.  Based 
on 2008 Inspector General (IG) report that examined DoD multiyear contracts of the C-
17, F/A-18, and the AH-64D, it was determined Boeing contracts for these three 
airframes resulted in an EPA liability of between $90.2 million and $260.3 million due to 
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Boeing contributions to pension plans causing abnormal increases in the BLS PPI 
(Inspector General [IG], 2008).  No contract modifications of this magnitude are found in 
the ConData database used.  The IG’s unique methodology indicates there is no 
consolidated database with accurate EPAs accounted for.  Therefore, the implication for 
the current study is to determine an estimate for EPAs.  To obtain an inclusive total of the 
EPA values, individual calculations for all multiyear contracts would need to be 
calculated from each respective EPA clause.  Therefore, EPA totals found in this research 
may be an underestimate.  Also, the two clauses referenced in this thesis are not inclusive 
of all EPA clauses.  EPA clauses are all written uniquely for what contract they 
supplement.  However, these two clauses were chosen as a proxy to analyze the utility of 
forecasts as a basis for calculating EPAs.  Parallels from this analysis can be applied to 
other EPA clauses regardless of the index specified. 
Methodology 
The modification database is first sorted on the division column to include only 
aircraft contracts.  This returns a total of 266 contracts.  The database is then filtered on 
modification description using the keywords “Price Adjustment”.  This returns all 
contract modifications related to any type of price adjustment, a total of 80 contract 
modifications.  The modification ID is then filtered specifically on “Price Adjustment” to 
parse out any modifications not related to price adjustments.  This returns a total of 49 
modifications.  The modification description is then filtered again using the keyword 
“economic” to return only modifications related to economic price adjustments.  This 
returns a total of 20 modifications.  An inclusion and exclusion table is shown in Table 1 
that walks through the steps of filtering the data. 
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Table 1: Inclusion/Exclusion Table 
 
 
 Once the data is filtered to show all economic price adjustments, the modification 
obligation amount and original contract price is escalated to a 2017 CP.  The obligation 
amounts are in CP dollar amounts.  It is assumed that the dollar values are in CP dollar 
amounts of the effective date of the contract.  CP 2017 is chosen as a normalized date 
because that is the latest effective date in the list of modifications.  To escalate the values 
to a CP dollar amount, the value of PPI336411 of Oct 2017 is divided by the index value 
of the effective date of the current contract.  This provides an escalation factor that is then 
multiplied by the modification obligation amount and the original contract price to return 
an escalated value of the obligation amount and contract price in CP 2017 dollars. 
 The escalated obligated amount of the EPA and original contract amount are then 
summed up by airframe.  This returns total dollar amount for both categories for a total of 
5 airframes.  To determine the percent of the total contract that the economic price 
adjustment makes up, the total obligated amount of the EPA is divided by the total 
contract price and then multiplied by 100.  The airframe, total contract price, total 
obligated amount, and percent of contract are then consolidated into a table. 
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values 
Accuracy of GI forecasts compared to actuals are important as they are the 
baseline from which EPA payments are determined.  If the forecasts deviate from the 
actuals, then they are not reflective of what is happening in the aircraft manufacturing 
Step Include Exclude Result 
Filter division All aircraft contracts All data unrelated to aircraft contracts 266 data points
Filter purchase description using 
keywords "Price Adjustment"
All data related to price adjustments 
of any kind
All data unrelated to "Price 
Adjustments" 80 data points
Filter modification ID using keywords 
"Price Adjustment"
All data categorized as price 
adjustment modifications
All data unrelated to "Price 
Adjustments" 49 data points
Filter purchase description using 
keyword "economic"
All data related to economic price 
adjustment modifications
All data unrelated to economic price 
adjustement modifications 20 data points
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industry.  The purpose of the EPA is to provide protection to both the government and 
contractor from unanticipated changes in the economy, not a forecast.  In the 2011 
AFLCMC study it was determined GI forecasts of PPI 3364 were historically below 
actuals of the PPI.  This research compares GI forecasts of PPI 336411, a more 
representative index of the aircraft manufacturing industry than the previously examined 
PPI 3364, to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) actuals including 8 more years of data than 
the 2011 AFLCMC study.  
Data and Data Sources 
The data sources for this section of the research are IHS Global Insight (GI) 
forecasts as well as BLS managed PPI data from PPI336411.  Global Insight is an 
economic analysis division of IHS Markit.  According to the IHS Markit website, IHS 
Markit connects data across variables to provide their customers with a more detailed 
view of their field of study (IHS Markit Website, 2017).  The DoD utilizes GI to provide 
detailed forecasts of all Producer Price Indexes which the DoD then applies to building 
EPA clauses for government contracts. 
PPI 336411 was chosen because it pertains to the price of aircraft manufacturing 
and it is the baseline PPI for the EPA clauses under examination.  The BLS historical 
data of PPI 336411 contains tracked actual index values spanning back to 1985 and is 
broken out by month.  These data points are then compared to the GI forecasts which are 
completed on a quarterly basis and span back to 2004 for PPI 336411.  Therefore, 
historical data from 2004 to 2017 is the final dataset utilized for comparison. 
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Data Limitations 
The data from BLS spans a total of 33 years, with measured values every month. 
This provides a total of 396 historically observed data points from PPI 336411.  
However, the average monthly forecast was used as a snapshot value of the escalation for 
each year.   
Global Insight’s forecast span only 13 years, with forecasted values of PPI 
336411 observed once every quarter.  Therefore, to have one forecast for each year, the 
quarter four forecasts are used as a determinant of each year’s forecast.  The limiting data 
source, in this case, is the Global Insight forecasts because there are fewer data points 
available than the BLS historical data.  Therefore, to address this limitation, the data is 
only compared from 2005 to 2017.  To limit any excess data noise while still allowing for 
robust analysis, a total of seven forecasts are used, starting with the 2005 quarter four 
forecast and every other year’s quarter four forecast through 2017. 
Methodology 
The first step in determining the accuracy of the GI forecasts is to compare the GI 
forecasts of PPI 336411 to the actual performance of the index.  The raw index historical 
values from 2002 to 2017 are plotted along with the average of the GI forecasts of years 
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017.  The escalation rate of PPI336411 is then 
calculated for both the historical data as well as all the GI forecasts using Equation 1. 
 
Equation 1: Escalation 
31 
In Equation 1, Eₙ is the escalation in year n, and PPIₙ is the PPI value in year n.  The 
escalation rates of the average GI forecast are then graphed along with the actual 
escalation rates to provide an analysis of the accuracy of the GI forecasts. 
 Because the escalation rates fluctuate up and down at a seemingly sporadic rate, it 
is difficult to determine the deviation of the GI forecasts to the actual escalation.  
Therefore, the deviation of the GI forecasted escalation to actual escalation is calculated 
for each year in the forecasts and plotted on a graph.  The deviation of the average 
forecast from the actuals is also calculated.  The deviation is calculated using Equation 2. 
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 
Equation 2: Deviation 
In Equation 2 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 is the GI forecast escalation rate and 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 is the actual escalation rate.  
To determine an overall accuracy trend of the GI forecasts, the net total deviation and 
absolute total deviation is calculated for each GI forecast used. 
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation 
In the 2011 AFLCMC study it was determined one defense contractor with annual 
labor escalation was well above GI forecasts.  This research compares a total of 6 
contractor’s direct labor escalation rates to GI forecasts and analyzes any trends.  If in 
general the contractors are assuming higher escalation in the FPRAs than what GI is 
forecasting, then they may be receiving compensation escalation already assumed in the 
contract’s base price. 
Data and Data Sources 
The data sources for this section of research include the GI forecasted values of 
PPI336411 as well as the assumed escalation rates manifested in contractor FPRAs.  The 
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FPRA documents represent 6 different contractors and are provided by AFLCMC cost 
and economics division.  The FPRAs contain the approved labor rates of each contractor 
on a yearly basis.  From these rate values, the assumed escalation rate can be derived by 
simply calculating the percentage increase of the direct labor portion of the FPRA rate 
year-by-year.  Due to releasability of proprietary information within the FPRAs the 
names of the specific contractors are not provided. 
Data and Limitations 
The limitations, already discussed, of the GI forecasted data remain for this 
research area.  The GI data only spans 13 years and only the fourth quarter forecasts are 
utilized.  However, the FPRA documents contain labor rates ranging from 2014 to 2021 
depending on the contractor.  Therefore, when comparing the derived escalation rates 
from the GI forecasts to the escalation rates within the FPRA documents, a maximum of 
five and a minimum of three data points are available for comparison. 
 The direct labor rates within the FPRAs are not a perfect representation of the 
assumed escalation by each contractor.  Actual escalation rates for firm fixed price 
contracts are not officially released to the government, therefore the FPRA labor rates are 
used as a proxy to determine an approximate escalation value each year for the 
contractors.  The direct labor rate portion of the FPRA are chosen as a proxy for deriving 
escalation because escalation is heavily influenced by labor.  
Methodology 
As previously discussed, GI data does not provide the escalation rates on a yearly 
basis.  Instead, the quarterly values of PPI 336411 are provided.  Therefore, the yearly 
escalation rates are derived from these values by way of equation 1.  Similarly, the 
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FPRAs do not provide yearly escalation rates.  Instead, the FPRAs contain the yearly 
labor rates for each contractor.  The escalation rates assumed in the FPRAs are derived by 
calculating the yearly percent change of the labor rates. 
 Within each FPRA the contractor details a multitude of different direct labor rates 
depending on the type of laborer.  Each of these categories of rates are escalated 
differently, however for comparison purposes, one value of direct labor escalation for 
each FPRA needs to be obtained.   Therefore, descriptive statistics are calculated for each 
year’s escalation values, including all labor categories.  The escalation rates of each 
category are also plotted to show a visual representation of any potential outliers.  The 
median was then chosen in the FPRAs as the consolidated rate for all years because this 
is the best measure of central tendency for both normal and skewed distributions. 
 For example, Table 2 shows the direct labor rates of a contractor within the 
FPRA.  As is shown, there are multiple categories of laborers and within each category 
are different skill classes.  All these laborers have different labor rates that are escalated 
each year differently.  The derived escalation rates are shown next to the resource code 
column.  The rates are approximately the same for each but have some variation.  To get 
one escalation rate for each year, descriptive statistics are calculated for each year.  The 
results of this are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 2: Contractor 1 FPRA Direct Labor Rates and Escalation 
 
 
Table 3: Contractor 1 Descriptive Statistics of Escalation Rates 
 
After the descriptive statistics are calculated, the escalation rates for each year are 
graphed to show the distribution.  This is shown in Figure 2.  In this case the rates appear 
to be evenly distributed around a mean with no potential outliers, therefore, the median is 
Category Skill Class 2017 2018 2019 2020 2017 2018 2019 2020
1 39.37$  40.31$  41.28$  42.27$  0.000% 2.388% 2.406% 2.398%
2 35.09$  35.93$  36.79$  37.67$  0.000% 2.394% 2.394% 2.392%
3 38.12$  39.03$  39.97$  40.93$  0.000% 2.387% 2.408% 2.402%
4 66.16$  67.75$  69.38$  71.05$  0.000% 2.403% 2.406% 2.407%
5 85.65$  87.71$  89.82$  91.98$  0.000% 2.405% 2.406% 2.405%
1 41.72$  42.72$  43.75$  44.80$  0.000% 2.397% 2.411% 2.400%
2 28.22$  28.90$  29.59$  30.30$  0.000% 2.410% 2.388% 2.399%
3 31.76$  32.52$  33.30$  34.10$  0.000% 2.393% 2.399% 2.402%
4 49.15$  50.33$  51.54$  52.78$  0.000% 2.401% 2.404% 2.406%
5 64.92$  66.48$  68.08$  69.71$  0.000% 2.403% 2.407% 2.394%
1 29.95$  30.67$  31.41$  32.16$  0.000% 2.404% 2.413% 2.388%
2 32.13$  32.90$  33.69$  34.50$  0.000% 2.397% 2.401% 2.404%
3 35.21$  36.06$  36.93$  37.82$  0.000% 2.414% 2.413% 2.410%
4 57.43$  58.81$  60.22$  61.67$  0.000% 2.403% 2.398% 2.408%
5 73.67$  75.44$  77.25$  79.10$  0.000% 2.403% 2.399% 2.395%
1 29.95$  30.67$  31.41$  32.16$  0.000% 2.404% 2.413% 2.388%
2 26.83$  27.47$  28.13$  28.81$  0.000% 2.385% 2.403% 2.417%
3 32.47$  33.25$  34.05$  34.87$  0.000% 2.402% 2.406% 2.408%
4 47.52$  48.66$  49.83$  51.03$  0.000% 2.399% 2.404% 2.408%
5 64.33$  65.87$  67.45$  69.07$  0.000% 2.394% 2.399% 2.402%
1 22.87$  23.42$  23.98$  24.56$  0.000% 2.405% 2.391% 2.419%
2 23.56$  24.13$  24.71$  25.30$  0.000% 2.419% 2.404% 2.388%
3 34.32$  35.14$  35.98$  36.84$  0.000% 2.389% 2.390% 2.390%
4 52.65$  53.91$  55.20$  56.52$  0.000% 2.393% 2.393% 2.391%
5 65.17$  66.73$  68.33$  69.97$  0.000% 2.394% 2.398% 2.400%
1 22.87$  23.42$  23.98$  24.56$  0.000% 2.405% 2.391% 2.419%
2 23.56$  24.13$  24.71$  25.30$  0.000% 2.419% 2.404% 2.388%
3 30.97$  31.71$  32.47$  33.25$  0.000% 2.389% 2.397% 2.402%
4 44.44$  45.51$  46.60$  47.72$  0.000% 2.408% 2.395% 2.403%
5 55.42$  56.75$  58.11$  59.50$  0.000% 2.400% 2.396% 2.392%
Eng/PMO
Support
Eng/PMO
Support
Escalation Factors
Eng/PMO
Support
DIREC+C45:M61T LABOR RATES
2018 2019 2020
Mean 2.400% 2.401% 2.401%
Median 2.402% 2.402% 2.402%
Mode 2.404% 2.413% 2.388%
Contractor 1
35 
chosen as the consolidated escalation rate for each year.  This process is completed for 
the rest of the 5 contractors, the results of which is shown in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 2: Contractor 1 Escalation Rates 
Next, the deviation of the GI forecasted escalation rates to each contractor’s 
escalation rates are calculated using Equation 2 but substituting the contractor’s 
escalation rate for 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴.  These deviations are then plotted for each contractor to give a 
visual comparison of the GI forecasts to what the contractors are assuming in their 
contracts.  A year-by-year deviation for each contractor is also provided in a table to 
show the frequency of positive and negative deviations. 
Change Point Analysis 
To this point the accuracy of GI forecasts compared to actuals and contractor 
FPRAs has been analyzed to provide evidence of the validity of utilizing GI forecasts as a 
benchmark for EPAs.  To gain a better understanding of whether GI forecasts are a valid 
tool to base EPA payments, the historical values of PPI 336411 are analyzed for any 
significant change points. 
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Data and Data Sources 
This section of the research uses the BLS managed historical PPI data.  As 
previously discussed, the focus is on the aircraft manufacturing PPI 336411. 
Data Limitations 
The BLS managed historical data of PPI 336411 date back to 1985 and is 
documented monthly.  The monthly values of the PPI are used, providing 384 data points. 
Methodology 
Finding significant changes can be a difficult task without a concrete measure of 
what defines a significant change in a data set.  Therefore, a change point analysis is 
conducted on the historical values of PPI 336411.  A change point analysis gives insight 
into if and when, there is a significant change in the average of the data.  If there is a 
significant change in the data, then further research can be done to determine what factors 
contributed to this shift.  When a data set has significant shifts in the average, basing 
future values of the data set on a forecasting model may not be advantageous because 
other factors are influencing the data that may not be able to be predicted. 
Determining the Range of Cumulative Sum Values 
 To begin the change point analysis, the historical values of PPI 336411 are 
converted to a monthly escalation rate by calculating the percent change each month.  
These escalation rates are then placed in a column next to the raw index values.  The 
average of these values is then calculated and titled ?̅?𝑥.  A second column is then created 
to calculate the difference in each year’s escalation rate to the average escalation rate.  
This column is titled x-?̅?𝑥.  The next step in the analysis is to calculate what is known as a 
cumulative sum.  A cumulative sum (CUMSUM) is a moving sum of the x-?̅?𝑥 values.  The 
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CUMSUM (𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛) column starts with a 𝑆𝑆0 value of 0.  Each subsequent 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 value is 
calculated using Equation 3.   
𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛= 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1+ (x-?̅?𝑥) 
Equation 3: CUMSUM 
In Equation 3, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 is the CUMSUM in time n, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 is the CUMSUM in time n-1, x is the 
escalation value in time n, and ?̅?𝑥 is the average of the escalation values from 1986 to 
2017.  Once all the 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 values are calculated, a range, or 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, is calculated on the values.  
The range calculation is shown in Equation 4.  An example of these calculations is shown 
in Table 4.  Because there are 384 rows, only the first 40 are shown in Table 4. 
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =   𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −  𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 
Equation 4: Range 
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Table 4: Change Point Variable Calculations 
 
 
ID Date PPI 336411
% 
change X-Xbar CUSUM Sdiff
Dec-85 100 0.00% 0 17.86%
1 Jan-86 100.9 0.90% 0.67% 0.67%
2 Feb-86 100.7 -0.20% -0.43% 0.24%
3 Mar-86 100.9 0.20% -0.03% 0.21%
4 Apr-86 100.8 -0.10% -0.33% -0.12%
5 May-86 100.4 -0.40% -0.63% -0.74%
6 Jun-86 100.4 0.00% -0.23% -0.97%
7 Jul-86 100.5 0.10% -0.13% -1.10%
8 Aug-86 100.4 -0.10% -0.33% -1.43%
9 Sep-86 98.6 -1.79% -2.02% -3.45%
10 Oct-86 98.6 0.00% -0.23% -3.68%
11 Nov-86 98.6 0.00% -0.23% -3.91%
12 Dec-86 98.6 0.00% -0.23% -4.14%
13 Jan-87 99.5 0.91% 0.68% -3.45%
14 Feb-87 100.1 0.60% 0.37% -3.08%
15 Mar-87 100.5 0.40% 0.17% -2.91%
16 Apr-87 100.0 -0.50% -0.73% -3.64%
17 May-87 99.2 -0.80% -1.03% -4.67%
18 Jun-87 99.3 0.10% -0.13% -4.79%
19 Jul-87 98.9 -0.40% -0.63% -5.43%
20 Aug-87 98.9 0.00% -0.23% -5.65%
21 Sep-87 98.9 0.00% -0.23% -5.88%
22 Oct-87 98.7 -0.20% -0.43% -6.31%
23 Nov-87 98.8 0.10% -0.13% -6.44%
24 Dec-87 98.3 -0.51% -0.74% -7.18%
25 Jan-88 99.7 1.42% 1.20% -5.98%
26 Feb-88 99.9 0.20% -0.03% -6.01%
27 Mar-88 99.9 0.00% -0.23% -6.24%
28 Apr-88 100.8 0.90% 0.67% -5.57%
29 May-88 100.9 0.10% -0.13% -5.70%
30 Jun-88 101.7 0.79% 0.56% -5.13%
31 Jul-88 101.3 -0.39% -0.62% -5.76%
32 Aug-88 101.3 0.00% -0.23% -5.99%
33 Sep-88 102.4 1.09% 0.86% -5.13%
34 Oct-88 102.6 0.20% -0.03% -5.16%
35 Nov-88 102.3 -0.29% -0.52% -5.68%
36 Dec-88 105.8 3.42% 3.19% -2.49%
37 Jan-89 107.7 1.80% 1.57% -0.93%
38 Feb-89 108.2 0.46% 0.24% -0.69%
39 Mar-89 109.1 0.83% 0.60% -0.09%
40 Apr-89 109.4 0.27% 0.05% -0.04%
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Identifying Visual Shifts in the CUMSUM Chart 
Next, the CUMSUM data is plotted on a graph to identify overarching shifts in 
the slope of the data.  There are points in the data where the slope changes, but it does not 
cause a change in the overall trend in the data.  These points are not identified as potential 
change points.  If the slope changes and causes a change in the trend of the data, then this 
point is identified as a potential change point.  After graphing the CUMSUM data, 
analysis is conducted to mathematically determine if a change did in fact occur.  This is 
done through a process called bootstrapping. 
Bootstrapping the Original CUMSUM Values 
 Bootstrapping is a process of randomly sampling with replacement from the 
original data set, deriving a statistic from the randomized sample and comparing to the 
original sample.  In this case, one bootstrap sample is manually created, and then a 
simulation is run with 10,000 iterations using @Risk software, effectively creating 
10,000 bootstrap samples.  An average is calculated for the sample.  Then 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 values are 
calculated for the sample and a 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value is calculated for the bootstrap.  The 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
value of the bootstrap is then compared to the original 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value.  If 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 then 
there is evidence to suggest there was a significant change in the average of the data in 
the given timeframe of 1986 to 2017.  If 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 > 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 then there is not sufficient evidence 
to suggest a significant change occurred in the average of the data from 1986 to 2017.  
For both situations, 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is the range of the original data and  𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛  is the range of the 
bootstrapped data.  From the simulation a distribution of the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛  values are created and 
the delimiters are adjusted so the right most delimiter is equal to the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 value of the 
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original data set and the left most delimiter is on the far left of the distribution.  This 
represents the frequency of when  𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 .  The resulting percentage between the 
two delimiters is the empirical coverage of a change occurred in the given time frame.  
The 𝛼𝛼 used is 0.05, so if the empirical coverage is greater than 95% then there is 
significant evidence to suggest a change occurred between 1986 and 2017.  
 Sum Squared Error Estimator of Change Point 
 Once the range of times are identified where a change occurred in the average of 
the data, an estimate of what month and year the change occurred is calculated.  The 
estimator used to identify the change point is Sum Squared Error (SSE).  The formula 
used to calculate SSE is shown in Equation 5. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚) = �(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − ?̅?𝑥1)2
𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛=1
+ � (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − ?̅?𝑥2)2
384
𝑛𝑛=𝑚𝑚+1
  
where 
?̅?𝑥1 =
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛=1
𝑛𝑛
  and  ?̅?𝑥2 =
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛384𝑛𝑛=𝑚𝑚+1
384−𝑚𝑚
 
Equation 5: SSE Change Point Estimator 
In Equation 5, 𝑚𝑚 represents the point at which it is determined there may be a 
change point.  𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 is the monthly escalation rate.  ?̅?𝑥1 represents the average of the data 
prior to point 𝑚𝑚 while ?̅?𝑥2 is the average of the data after point 𝑚𝑚.  This equation breaks 
the data into two segments on either side of the tested point and estimates the average of 
each one of the segments.  The point 𝑚𝑚 is then compared to the average of the two 
segments.  The value of 𝑚𝑚 that minimizes SSE is the best estimate of last point before a 
change occurred (Taylor, 2000).  
 For the data set, three periods of time are identified as having potential change 
points within them, 1986 to 1999, 1996 to 2005, and 2005 to 2017.  A narrower period of 
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time around each change point is then identified based on the CUMSUM chart depicted 
in Figure 9 of Chapter 4.  For the first change point within 1986 to 1999, the SSE values 
from January 1995 (𝑚𝑚 = 109) to May 1997 (𝑚𝑚 = 137) are calculated.  For the second 
change point within 1996 to 2005, the SSE values from October 1998 (𝑚𝑚 = 154) to 
March 2000 (𝑚𝑚 = 171) are calculated.  For the third change point within 2005 to 2017, 
the SSE values from September 2008 (𝑚𝑚 = 273) to July 2011 (𝑚𝑚 = 307) are calculated.  
Within each one of these ranges, the minimum SSE are identified and this is the best 
estimate for the change point within each range. 
Retrospective EPA versus Prospective EPA (MAPE) 
After the change point analysis is conducted, a retrospective approach to EPAs 
was compared to the current prospective approach by comparing Mean Absolute Percent 
Error (MAPE). 
Data and Data Sources 
This section of the research uses the BLS managed historical PPI data.  As 
previously discussed, the focus is on the aircraft manufacturing PPI 336411.  IHS GI 
forecasts of PPI 336411 are used as well. 
Data Limitations 
For each base year calculation of the MAPE, only 10 years from the specified 
base year are used.  MAPE values from base year 2000 to 2009 are calculated because 
the year 2000 is identified as a change point in the historical data of PPI 336411 where 
the inflation rates change from being below the average to above the average.  2009 is the 
last base year used because there is only historical data through 2018 and with a 10-year 
assumption from the base year, 2009 is the last year able to be used. 
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Methodology 
MAPE is a variable that measures the error of a forecast value to an actual value 
in percentage terms.  It is typically utilized to compare to forecasting techniques, 
however, in this situation it is used to compare two approaches to EPA clauses.   
The current approach is a prospective approach, which means EPA payments are 
calculated based on changes in forecasts.  If the current years forecast varies by a specific 
threshold percentage from the established base year forecast, then an EPA may be 
triggered.  In the EPA clause referenced in Appendix A, a base year 2009 quarter 4 
forecast of PPI 336411 is used, therefore, for the MAPE calculations, the same base 
forecast is used.  The retrospective approach is similar to the prospective approach, 
however, instead of using forecasts, historical values are used.  Specifically, a base year 
of the historical index of PPI 336411 is chosen and this is compared to the current year of 
the index.  A ten-year period of performance for the purposes of the EPA clause is 
assumed.  Therefore, the base year of the forecast will be adjusted every ten years.  Once 
it is established which two methods are being compared, the MAPE for both are 
calculated.  The MAPE equation is shown in Equation 6. 
�
1
𝑛𝑛
𝛴𝛴
|𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴|
|𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴|
� × 100 
Equation 6: MAPE 
For the MAPE calculation of the prospective approach, the 2009 quarter 4 
forecast is the Actual value of the equation.  The Forecast value used are the 2010-2017 
quarter 4 forecast.  The 2009 quarter 4 forecasts begin in 2009 and span to 2018.  The 
forecasts are then projected to 2027 using the current practice of maintaining the previous 
years’ forecast escalation rate for all out years.  This projection to 2027 is also done for 
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the 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts.  The MAPE for each quarter 4 forecast from 2010-
2017 are then calculated and the average of the MAPEs during this time period is 
calculated. 
The MAPE of the 2009 quarter 4 forecasts to the historical index values of PPI 
336411 is also calculated and compared to the MAPE of the retrospective approach 
previously discussed. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter detailed the methodologies for each research objective.  With the 
2011 AFLCMC study as a baseline to verify and compare research results, the validity of 
the EPA clauses was analyzed by doing the following.  First, the historical EPA amounts 
were totaled in a tabular format to show the cost impact of EPAs in fixed price contracts.  
Then the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 were compared to BLS actuals of the index to 
determine the accuracy of the forecasts.  Next the GI forecasts were compared to FPRA 
derived labor escalation rates to determine if EPA payments have a portion already 
assumed in the contract’s base price.  Next, a change point analysis was conducted to 
identify changes in the average of the historical data that may be effecting the accuracy of 
the forecasts.  Last, a MAPE value of the current prospective approach is compared to an 
average MAPE from 2000-2009 of the retrospective approach.  Also, the MAPE of the 
2009 quarter 4 forecast as compared to the historical values of PPI 336411 is calculated.  
The next chapter will discuss the results of the each of these methodologies as well as 
interpret the findings. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter 4 discusses the results of each research question as well as the relevance 
of these results.  The chapter provides answers to what historically is being paid to the 
government and to the contractor in relation to EPAs, the accuracy of Global Insight (GI) 
forecasts in comparison to actual values of PPI 336411, how Global Insight escalation 
forecasts compare to what contractors are assuming in FPRAs, and if it is valid to base an 
EPA clause on an index forecast. 
Historical Economic Price Adjustments 
Knowing how much is currently obligated due to EPAs is important as it gives 
insight into a few pieces of data.  The first is whether the EPA clause, as written, provides 
equal protection to both the government and contractor.  An EPA clause providing equal 
protection should over the course of multiple years have close to equal instances of 
upward and downward adjustments.  Second, it provides insight into the cost impact of 
EPAs.   
Table 5 shows the total contract price, total obligated amount, and percent of 
contract related to economic price adjustments separated by airframe.  A negative amount 
in the “Total Obligated Amount” column indicates a downward EPA, while a positive 
value indicates an upward EPA.  Out of the 266 aircraft contracts and modifications only 
a total of 20 of the modifications are related to EPAs, which indicates EPAs are not as 
pervasive as previously believed.  Of these 20 modifications, 9 are downward 
adjustments, which indicate money being returned to the government.  This implies that 
since 1981, the EPA clauses have provided equal protection to both government and 
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contractor in times of unanticipated fluctuations in the aircraft manufacturing industry.  
The total dollar value of the original contract price of the modifications is 
$81,057,561,405, while the net obligated amount of the modifications is $693,636.  This 
represents 0.0009% of the overall contracts value.  Based on this minimal amount being 
paid in EPAs, EPAs do not have a significant cost impact to the Air Force on a net basis.  
However, as shown in Table 5, division 2 has upward adjustments totaling $22,744,725.  
As a percentage of the total contract price this is not a large amount, though this still 
represents over $22M in incorrectly allocated money that could have been used for higher 
priority items.  This loss of obligation authority for other priorities represents the 
opportunity cost of inaccurate forecasts. 
Though the cost impact of EPAs is not large in comparison to the overall contract 
values, there is something to be gained from further analysis.  As will be discussed in 
questions 2, 3, and 4, basing an economic adjustment payment off a change in a 
forecasted index is not reflective of actual changes in the economy.  Instead, if the EPA is 
to reflect actual fluctuations in the market, it is appropriate to base the payment off how 
much the current index value deviates from historical averages of the index.  
Table 5: Economic Price Adjustment Amount by Aircraft 
 
Division
Modification 
Count
Total Contract Price
Total Obligated 
Amount (EPA)
Percent of 
Contract
1 2 29,653,250,814$       (7,475,916)$        -0.0252%
2 4 10,285,600,121$       22,744,725$       0.2211%
3 3 18,374,457,653$       52,862$              0.0003%
4 5 3,572,044,461$         (3,363,143)$        -0.0942%
5 6 19,172,108,357$       (11,264,891)$     -0.0588%
Absolute Total 20 81,057,461,405$       44,901,537$       0.0554%
Net Total 20 81,057,461,405$       693,636$            0.0009%
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The overall contract price by airframe is then compared to the total EPA amount 
obligated to determine if contract size has any influence on the EPA amount, positive or 
negative.  Figure 3 depicts a graph of the total contract price and obligated amount by 
aircraft.  Because the EPA amounts are so small in magnitude compared to the overall 
contract values, the EPA obligated amounts are graphed separately in Figure 4 to show 
how each airframe differs.   The contract associated with division 1 has the greatest value 
at $29.65B but ranks third out of the five airframes in terms of EPA amount.  Contrary, 
division 4 has the smallest contract value of $3.57B but ranks fourth out of five in EPA 
magnitude.  This is an indication that magnitude of the contract does not have an 
influence on the magnitude of the EPA.  Instead the magnitude and frequency of an EPA 
is more likely influenced by the wording of the EPA and what assumptions the payment 
is based on.  These will be examined in research questions 2, 3, and 4.  
 
Figure 3: Total Contract Price and Obligated Amount of EPA by Aircraft 
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Figure 4: Total Obligated Amount of EPA by Aircraft 
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values 
After determining that magnitude of contract does not influence magnitude or 
frequency of EPA, the accuracy of the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 to actuals is examined.  
Figure 5 shows the average forecast values of PPI 336411 along with the actuals.  Based 
on this graph it appears the forecasts fall well in line with the actual raw index values.  
However, the EPA clause language does not rely on a forecast of the raw index value as a 
determinant of payment.  Instead it focuses on the escalation of the index.  Therefore, the 
average forecasted escalation rate versus the actual escalation rate is shown in Figure 6. 
1 2 3 4 5
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Figure 5: Actual vs Average Forecast (Raw Index Values) 
 
 
Figure 6: Actual vs Average Forecast (Escalation Rates) 
 
From the escalation graph it becomes clear the forecasted escalation is generally 
in line with actual escalation from 2005 to 2008.  After 2008 the forecasts begin to 
deviate above and below actuals until around 2013 where they are steadily above actuals 
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through 2017.  To get a better visual of the magnitude of deviation of the forecasts from 
the actuals, the deviation graph is depicted in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Average Deviation of Forecasts 
 
The deviation graph further clarifies that the forecasted escalation rates deviate 
and are below the actuals from 2005 to 2014 and above from 2014 to 2017.  This means 
since 2014 GI has over-estimated the escalation of PPI 336411.  This is contrary to what 
was initially explored in the 2011 study by AFLCMC which suggested GI forecasts are 
generally underestimating the PPI.  However, the original study explored the accuracy of 
PPI 3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing which is the highest-level PPI in 
the aerospace industry.  Because the EPA clauses refer to PPI 336411 as the baseline for 
adjustments, it is appropriate to analyze the accuracy of this index instead of the accuracy 
of the higher-level index.  A sensitivity analysis was also conducted comparing the 
January, June, and December BLS values of PPI 336411 to GI forecasts.  This resulted in 
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similar trends of inaccuracies as when using the average BLS value.  The graph of the 
original study is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Forecast of PPI 3364 Raw Values vs Actuals (2011 AFLCMC Study) 
 
To detail how each year’s forecast specifically deviates from the actuals Table 6 
is provided.  It depicts the deviation by year of the fourth quarter forecasts of escalation 
to the actual escalation values managed by BLS.  Red cells indicate when the GI forecasts 
are below the actuals.  The right-hand columns show the net total deviation and absolute 
total deviation to give an indication of the overall accuracy of the GI insight forecasts to 
the actuals.  The bottom row is the average percent deviation of each given year. 
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Table 6: Deviation of GI Escalation Forecasts to BLS Actuals 
 
Based on this table, as well as the other graphics discussed in this section, it is 
evident GI forecasts of PPI336411are generally inaccurate.  Forecasts before 2009 have 
negative net percent deviations which indicates they are below actuals, while forecasts 
after 2009 have positive net percent deviations which indicate they are above actuals.  
This general inaccuracy can be a result of a multitude of factors not directly related to the 
aircraft manufacturing industry.  Because there was a switch from underestimation to 
overestimation in 2009, this may indicate a change point in the historical data which may 
be causing inaccuracies as will be discussed in the change point analysis section of this 
chapter.  Additionally, this is further evidence the GI forecasts do not fully reflect the 
state of the aircraft manufacturing industry.  If EPA clauses are written to protect the 
government and contractor of unanticipated changes in the market, but are based on 
changes in forecasted values, then the EPA clauses are not accomplishing their goal and 
EPA payments may not be indicative of market fluctuations. 
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation  
 After examining how accurately the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 represent the 
actual market, the accuracy of the forecasts to the direct labor component of the 
contractor FPRA rates is examined.  The results indicate not only are GI forecasts not a 
truly accurate representation of the market fluctuations, but they deviate from 
contractor’s direct labor rates as well. 
Q4 Forecast 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Net Percent 
Deviation
Absolute 
Percent 
Deviation
2005 -0.02% -0.31% -0.83% -2.54% -1.92% -1.12% -2.97% -3.09% -2.05% -0.96% 0.54% -15.27% 16.35%
2007 -0.02% 0.01% 0.05% -0.66% -0.31% 0.28% -2.14% -2.87% -2.13% -1.36% -0.15% -9.30% 9.97%
2009 -0.02% -1.21% -4.17% -4.84% -3.99% -2.89% -1.10% -0.33% 0.02% 0.43% -18.54% 19.00%
2011 -0.01% -0.29% 0.13% 1.06% 2.70% 3.78% 4.88% 5.71% 12.26% 18.57%
2013 0.00% 0.54% 2.19% 3.31% 4.34% 5.12% 10.38% 15.51%
2015 0.02% -0.15% 0.83% 1.69% 0.69% 2.69%
2017 0.02% 0.22% 0.02% 0.24%
Average -0.02% -0.31% -0.42% -1.27% -0.63% -1.00% -1.86% -1.99% -1.61% -1.02% 0.37% 1.05% 1.66% 2.63% -4.42% 15.84%
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As discussed in Chapter 3, each FPRA had multiple rates to choose from in each 
year.  Therefore, to get one consolidated rate in each year, descriptive statistics are 
calculated for each year’s rates to determine if the mean or median is more appropriate 
for said year.  The median was chosen for all rates, as this was the most representative 
rate for skewed distributions and random distributions.  Table 7 shows the consolidated 
escalation rate chosen for each contractor in each year from the FPRA. 
Table 7: FPRA Escalation Rates by Contractor 
 
 
Table 8 shows the total deviation of the GI forecasts from each contractor’s 
escalation rates.  The empty cells indicate where escalation data is not available from the 
contractor FPRA.  The table is conditionally formatted to show whether the GI forecasts 
are below the contractor rates.  Of the 32 observed comparisons, 24 of the GI forecasts 
are below the contractor rates.  Though only 6 contractors are compared, these 6 
contractors make up a majority of prime contractors for ACAT I aircraft programs.  With 
forecasts being consistently lower than the contractor assumptions, the government is 
more likely to be paying an upward EPA for a change in escalation the contractor already 
has assumed within the FPRA.  A scenario is spelled out below to better explain this 
potential double payment situation. 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Contractor 1 2.40% 2.40% 2.40%
Contractor 2 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 2.99%
Contractor 3 3.17% 2.31% 2.48%
Contractor 4 2.73% 2.96% 2.84% 2.60% 2.60%
Contractor 5 2.06% 2.00% 2.13% 2.17%
Contractor 6 2.82% 2.82% 2.82% 2.82%
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A contractor’s FPRA has labor escalation of 3.0%, while the baseline GI forecast 
of PPI 336411 spelled out in the EPA clause is 200.  The EPA clause has an upper 
minimum threshold to trigger an EPA payment of 2.0%.  If the current years forecast is 
greater than 204 (a 2.0% increase from 200), then an upward EPA payment is triggered.  
Meanwhile, the contractor already accounted for at least 3.0% escalation, but will receive 
an EPA payment regardless.  
Table 8: Total Deviation of GI Forecasts to FPRAs by Contractor 
 
 
 A graphical representation of the deviation of GI forecasts to Contractor 2 is 
shown in Figure 9.  As is shown, GI is consistently lower than the contractor rates.  
Though not all the observed contractors are consistently above the GI forecasts, a 
majority of the GI comparison points across all contractors deviate negatively from the 
contractor rates.  As is shown, contractor 5 shows all positive deviations, meaning GI 
forecasts were above what was found in the FPRA.  Though this stands out as an 
anomaly compared to other contractors, there was nothing about this specific contractor 
that would indicate lower FPRA escalation rates would be expected.  The other 5 
contractor graphics are shown in Appendix B.  As was previously discussed, if forecasts 
are consistently lower than contractor escalation and an EPA is triggered, that EPA is 
more likely to be a double payment of escalation already assumed in the base price of the 
contract.   Next, the results of the change point analysis are discussed. 
Contractor 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Total
Contractor 1 -0.203% 0.498% 0.071% 0.847% -0.578% 0.634%
Contractor 2 -1.401% -0.777% -1.047% -0.625% -1.955% -5.805%
Contractor 3 -1.070% -0.512% -0.938% -0.163% -1.587% -4.270%
Contractor 4 -0.130% -1.330% -1.930% -0.531% -0.794% -3.315% -5.468% -13.498%
Contractor 5 0.545% 1.800% 1.222% 2.267% 0.610% 6.445%
Contractor 6 -1.040% -1.124% -1.703% -0.658% -2.314% -6.840%
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Figure 9: GI Forecast Deviation from Contractor 2 FPRA 
 
Change Point Analysis 
After determining the GI forecasts accuracy to actuals and contractor FPRAs, a 
change point analysis is conducted on historical values of PPI 336411 to determine if 
basing the EPA clause off a forecast is appropriate.  The change point analysis identifies 
ranges of time where there are significant changes in the average of the data.  If there are 
significant changes in the average of the historical data, then forecasting future values 
becomes difficult if not near impossible to do so relatively accurately.  The GI forecasts 
are based on the historical values of the index which may be heavily influenced by 
outside factors, as indicated by a change point.   
The first step in the change point analysis is identifying time periods where there 
are potential changes in the average.  The cumulative sum chart in Figure 10 depicts 
where potential changes in the average of the escalation rate occurred.  The cumulative 
sum is the cumulative sum of the deviations of the observed values from the average of 
the observations.  A period where there is a positive slope on the graph indicates the 
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values during that time tend to be above the average.  Likewise, a period where there is a 
negative slope indicates a time when values tend to be below the average.  Therefore, a 
sudden change in the slope resulting in a change in the overall trend of the data is 
identified as a potential change point.  There are 3 potential change points identified. 
 
Figure 10: Cumulative Sum Chart 
 
As shown in Figure 10, there are potential change points from 1993 to 1996, 1997 
to 2000, and 2007 to 2010.  However, first the entire range of data is bootstrapped to 
determine if at least 1 of these 3 change points flags as statistically significant before 
narrowing the analysis.  Figure 11 depicts the empirical coverage from 1986 to 2017 that 
a change occurs. 
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Figure 11: Empirical Coverage of Change Occurring from 1986 to 2017 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the  𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛  values.  As discussed in Chapter 3 the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛  
values are the range of the bootstrapped data which is then compared to the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  of the 
original data set.  The x-axis represents the 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛   value while the y-axis represents 
frequency.  The 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 of the original data is located at the top of the graph on the right 
most end of the delimiter.  The frequency of simulation iterations where 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  is 
then tested against an α of 0.05.  Figure 11 suggests that with 99.9% empirical coverage a 
change occurs between 1986 and 2017 based on an α of 0.05.  This indicates that further 
investigation is required to better pinpoint when the changes occur.  To identify the time 
periods where a change potentially occur, the graph of the CUMSUM values of the 
original data set are analyzed.  The chart is shown in Figure 10.  To verify that changes 
did occur during these time frames with greater confidence, the same procedure for a 
change point analysis explained previously is conducted from 1986 to 1996, 1996 to 
2017, and 1996 to 2005, the results of which are provided next. 
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The results of the first bootstrapping range from 1986-1999 are shown in Figure 
12.  As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, if  𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , then there is statistical 
evidence a change occurs in the time frame.  Figure 12 illustrates 99.7% of the time 
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 which verifies with 99.7% empirical coverage there is a change in the 
average of the escalation rate between 1986 and 1999.  Based on the 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is 
significant evidence a change occurs in the escalation rate during this time frame. 
 
Figure 12: Empirical Coverage 1986-1999 
 The results of the bootstrapping 1996 to 2005 are shown in Figure 13.  Out of 
10,000 bootstraps of the data, 9,990 of the iterations resulted in a 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 <
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 .  Therefore, with 99.9% empirical coverage, a change occurs in the average of the 
escalation rate between 1996 and 2005.  Based on an 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is significant 
evidence a change occurs in the average of the escalation rate. 
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Figure 13: Empirical Coverage 1996-2005 
The results of the bootstrapping from 2005 to 2017 are shown in Figure 14.  
Again, 10,000 bootstraps are conducted and a total of 9,950 of the bootstraps result in a 
𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 < 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.  This means with 99.5% empirical coverage a change in the average of the 
escalation rate occurs between 2005 and 2017.  Using an 𝛼𝛼 of 0.05, this is significant 
evidence that a change in the average did occur. 
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Figure 14: Empirical Coverage 2005-2017 
 Next the estimates of when the changes in the average of the data occurred are 
identified.  As discussed in Chapter 3, each bootstrapped time period was further 
narrowed down based on the CUMSUM chart in Figure 10.  From January 1995 to May 
1997, the point with the minimum SSE was February 1995 (𝑚𝑚 = 110) with an SSE of 
0.00597.  From 1996 to 2005, the point with the minimum SSE was October 1998 (𝑚𝑚 =
154) with an SSE of 0.00643.  From September 2008 to July 2011, the point with the 
minimum SSE was February 2009 (𝑚𝑚 = 278) with an SSE of 0.00651.  All these points 
are identified as change points.  They are then verified by looking back at the raw data to 
see if there are significant changes.  For the first change point, the escalation rate drops 
from 1.26% in January 1995 to 0.15% in February 1995.  This indicates a significant 
change in the average of the data.  For the second change point the escalation rate begins 
at 0.07% in October 1998 and promptly increases to 0.21% in December 1998.  This 
verifies a change point did in fact occur.  For the last change point, the escalation rate 
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drops from 0.29% in February 2009 to -1.24% in March 2009.  This indicates a change 
point did occur. 
 The results of this research question verify 3 time periods of change in the 
average of the historical PPI data; 1986-1999, 1999-2005, and 2005-2017.  These 
changes are potentially caused by factors not directly related to the aircraft manufacturing 
industry, and hence make it difficult to accurately forecast future values of the PPI, recall 
the results of research question 2 which concluded GI forecasts are generally inaccurate    
When basing an EPA clause on changes in forecasts of a baseline index, the error of the 
forecast is inherently included in the value of the EPA.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Defense Acquisition Regulations section PGI 216.203-4 spells out the details of how to 
correctly write an EPA clause, but it does not mandate whether this clause should be 
based on historical values of the PPI or forecasts of the PPI.  Therefore, it may be more 
advantageous to base the EPA payments on how the current PPI value compares to 
historical averages of the index (retrospective EPA), than basing the EPA on changes in 
forecasts of the index (prospective EPA). 
Retrospective EPA vs Prospective EPA Clause (MAPE) 
After identifying the change points in the historical data, the MAPE of the current 
prospective approach is calculated.  This produces 8 MAPE values because the 2009 
quarter 4 forecast is compared to the 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts.  An average of these 
MAPEs is calculated which is 7.0%.  This MAPE is then compared to the proposed 
retrospective approach.  The MAPEs using 2000-2009 base years to the current year are 
calculated using the historical index escalation rates of PPI 336411.  The year 2000 is 
chosen as this identified as a change point in the data as previously discussed.  2009 is an 
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end year, because a 10-year period of performance is used.  There are only historical 
index values up to 2018, so the last base year able to be used is 2009.  An average of the 
MAPEs from 2000-2009 is then calculated which is 47%. 
Comparing the current prospective approach to the proposed retrospective 
approach, it is clear the current prospective approach produces a lower MAPE.  However, 
as it has been previously illustrated, the GI forecasts are not reflective of the economy, 
there is error.  Because the current EPA payments are solely based on changes in GI 
forecasts, there is inherent error in the EPA payments.  To make the EPA payments more 
representative of changes in the economy, the proposed retrospective approach should be 
used.  To show the retrospective approach is more reflective of the economy than the GI 
forecasts, the MAPE of the 2009 quarter 4 forecast to the historical values of PPI 336411 
is calculated, which is 60%.  By utilizing the retrospective approach instead of the 
prospective approach, the MAPE decreases from 60% to an average of 47% from 2000-
2009.  It is unknown at this point how taking this retrospective approach will change the 
EPAs being paid, however, the retrospective approach will allow the EPAs to capture 
actual changes in the economy, not in forecasts. 
Conclusion 
This chapter summarized the results of the research.  First, the historical EPAs 
were categorized by aircraft and totaled to detail what cost impact these adjustments 
have.  Out of 266 contracts dating back to a 1982 award date, 20 modifications were 
found related to EPAs.  The net total amount obligated of these adjustments totaled 
$693,636 out of a total of $81,057,461,405 worth of contracts.  This indicates EPAs since 
1982 have made up 0.0009% of all contracts from the ConWrite database.  Though a cost 
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impact of 0.0009% of all contracts is not a significant amount, there is an instance of a 
single EPA reaching $22,744,725 which represents a loss of obligation authority for 
higher priority items on contract.  The accuracy of the GI forecasts of PPI 336411 is then 
analyzed as compared to BLS actuals.  The results indicate since 2013 forecasts have 
deviated consistently above actuals.  This is contrary to the original 2011 study which 
looked at the accuracy of top-level PPI 3364 and suggested GI forecasts of said index 
tended to be below actuals.  A total net percent deviation of -4.42% from the actuals and 
typical upper and lower thresholds for EPA payments of 2.0%, indicates the forecasts do 
not accurately reflect the aircraft manufacturing industry, and the EPA modifications 
currently occurring may be mitigated if they were not based on forecast changes. 
After determining GI forecasts are not reflective of the aircraft manufacturing 
market, the GI forecasts were compared to contractor FPRA labor escalation rates.  The 
results showed GI forecasts consistently below contractor escalation rates which could 
result in double payment of escalation impacts already assumed by the contractor and 
therefore unneeded.  It is unclear what the value of the EPA payments fall into this 
category, however, if EPAs continue to be based on changes in inaccurate forecasts rather 
than changes in actuals, then the probability of an double payment will remain. 
Lastly, it is determined through a change point analysis there are three periods of 
time where there are significant changes in the average of the historical data of PPI 
336411.  This is a probable reason why the GI forecasts deviate from what is occurring in 
the index.  These changes may be caused by factors not directly related to the aircraft 
manufacturing industry, and hence are difficult to forecast.  With 3 change points over 
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the last 32 years, it is likely more will occur in the future that will not be accounted for in 
future forecasts.  
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter summarizes the results and conclusions drawn from the research 
conducted.  Each research question is answered and given context to the overall 
recommendation. 
Research Questions Answered 
The overarching research objective of this thesis was to evaluate the validity of 
Global Insight (GI) forecasts as a benchmark for EPA payments of current EPA clauses 
pertaining to firm fixed price contracts of ACAT I aircraft programs.  This was an 
expansion on a study conducted in 2011 by AFLCMC on EPAs in fixed price contracts.  
The research objective was accomplished answering six research questions.   
Historical Economic Price Adjustments 
The first research question examines what was historically paid for Economic 
Price Adjustments.  Data derived from the ConData database was utilized to determine a 
total amount obligated for EPAs by airframe since 1981.  This was a new addition to the 
previous AFLCMC study as no analysis was done on what cost impact EPAs historically 
have.  Based on 2008 Inspector General (IG) report that examined DoD multiyear 
contracts of the C-17, F/A-18, and the AH-64D, it was determined Boeing contracts for 
these three airframes experienced significant price increases of around $1.9 billion due to 
EPAs (IG report, 2008).  Because this $1.9 billion in adjustments was not included in the 
ConData database, this represents a limitation of the data and the ConData may be an 
underestimation of EPAs.  This research found EPAs have a very small cost impact in 
relation to total contract value.  Of all the contracts and modifications in the database, 
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EPA modifications made up 0.043% of the total.  Of the 20 EPA modifications, 0.055% 
of the original contract value was represented by adjustments from these modifications.  
Though it is a seemingly insignificant amount, there is potentially still cost savings to be 
realized by rewording the EPA clauses. 
Also, out of a total of 20 EPA contracts, 16 were non-zero, of which, 9 were of 
negative value and 7 were of positive value.  This indicates the EPA clauses are resulting 
in a somewhat even split between upward and downward adjustments, with slightly more 
downward adjustments.  The EPA clauses are created to provide equal and unbiased 
protection to both the government and the contractor in times of economic uncertainty.  
The split of upward and downward adjustments illustrates the EPA clauses are 
succeeding in this goal.   
Global Insight Forecasts vs Historical Values 
The second research question compared the accuracy of Global Insight forecasts 
to BLS historical values of PPI 336411.  Of the 13 years of forecasts available, only the 
years of 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017 were compared to actuals, as 7 
forecasts was viewed as a valid amount to determine general accuracy. 
Including forecasts dating back to 2005, GI tends to forecast escalation of PPI 
336411 above actuals tracked by Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS).  The average net 
total deviation of the GI forecasts was -4.42% which represents a large amount as 
historical escalation of PPI 336411 averages only 2.71%.  This is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Deviation of GI Escalation Forecasts to BLS Actuals 
 
 
 Additionally, the purpose of an EPA is to provide equal protection to both 
government and contractor from unanticipated changes in the market.  With forecasts 
deviating from actuals by -4.42%, EPA payments based on these forecasts may not 
represent actual market fluctuations and hence the EPA clause may not be accomplishing 
its goal. 
Global Insight Forecasts vs Contractor FPRA Direct Labor Escalation 
The third research question examined how GI forecasts compare to escalation 
rates manifested in contractor forward pricing rate agreements (FPRA).  A total of 6 
contractor FPRAs were analyzed to determine how their direct labor escalation rates 
compare to GI forecasts of escalation.  These 6 top government contractors were chosen 
because of data availability, but the names of the contractors were excluded to limit the 
release of proprietary information.  The conclusion was GI forecasts were consistently 
lower than direct labor escalation values derived from the FPRAs.  This is shown in 
Table 8.   
Table 8: Total Deviation of GI Forecasts to FPRAs by Contractor 
 
Contractor 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Total
Contractor 1 -0.20% 0.50% 0.07% 0.85% -0.58% 0.65%
Contractor 2 -1.40% -0.78% -1.05% -0.63% -1.95% -5.81%
Contractor 3 -1.07% -0.51% -0.94% -0.16% -1.59% -4.27%
Contractor 4 -0.06% -1.19% -1.95% -0.55% -0.82% -3.34% -5.49% -13.40%
Contractor 5 0.55% 1.80% 1.22% 2.27% 0.61% 6.44%
Contractor 6 -1.04% -1.13% -1.71% -0.66% -2.32% -6.86%
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This underestimation is likely to lead to an EPA payment already assumed in the base 
price of the contract. 
Change Point Analysis 
 The fourth research question analyzed the historical data of PPI 336411 to find 
any significant change points in the data.  The method used to identify change point dates 
utilized Sum Squared Error (SSE) and can be narrowed down to a specific month and 
year of change.  To answer this question, a change point analysis was conducted on three 
time periods where there was a suspected change in the average of the historical values of 
PPI 336411, 1986-1999, 1999-2005, and 2005-2017.  From these time periods using 
simulation and an SSE change point estimator, it was determined change points occurred 
in February 1995, October 1998, and February 2009.  These change points may be caused 
by factors unrelated to the aircraft manufacturing industry and could be an explanation 
for the forecasting GI forecasting inaccuracy.   
Retrospective versus Prospective EPA Clause (MAPE) 
 The fifth research question compared the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) 
of the current approach to EPAs to a proposed retrospective approach.  Based on the EPA 
clause in Appendix A, the current approach is a prospective approach, which means EPA 
payments are calculated based on changes in forecasts.  If the current years forecast 
varies by a specific threshold percentage from the established base year forecast, then an 
EPA may be triggered.  The retrospective approach being recommended instead uses 
historical values of PPI 336411.  Specifically, a base year of the historical index of PPI 
336411 is chosen and this is compared to the current year of the index.  A ten-year period 
of performance for the purposes of the EPA clause was assumed.  Therefore, the base 
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year of the forecast is adjusted every ten years.  For the prospective approach, 8 MAPE 
values were calculated, utilizing the 2009 quarter 4 forecasts as the base year forecast and 
comparing to 2010-2017 quarter 4 forecasts.  These 8 values were then consolidated to an 
average MAPE of 13%.  For the retrospective approach, 10 MAPE values were 
calculated using 2000-2009 as the base year index values.  These 10 MAPEs were then 
consolidated into one average MAPE of 47%. 
Though the current prospective approach results in a lower average MAPE than 
the proposed retrospective approach, because the prospective approach relies solely on 
forecasts, any EPA payment calculated from this will inherently contain elements of 
forecast error.  This results in EPA payments not representative of market changes.  
Therefore, the retrospective approach should still be used as it results in an average 47% 
MAPE compared to actuals while the prospective approach results in a 60% MAPE when 
compared to actuals. 
Recommendations 
Based on the frequency and magnitude of historical EPA modifications, no 
change is recommended to the current upper and minimum thresholds in the EPA clauses 
to trigger an EPA payment.  These EPAs make up a very small portion of total contract 
value and are acceptably split between upward and downward adjustments, which 
indicates equal protection to government and contractor.  The 2008 IG report suggested 
that there were large sums of unwarranted EPAs being paid to Boeing due to 
contributions from Boeing to their pension plan heavily influencing the value of the index 
being tracked for purposes of EPAs.  However, based on the current study, it is clear 
these large EPA payments are not pervasive DoD wide.   
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Based on the two EPA clauses examined, the early lots of production have 
between a 2-2.5% upper and lower threshold of deviation of the baseline forecast to the 
current year forecast.  As discussed in Chapter 4, if the current year forecast deviates 
from the baseline forecast by more than these threshold percentages, then an EPA is 
triggered.  Because historically, EPAs make up a small percentage of overall contract 
expenses, there is currently no need to change the upper and lower threshold percentage 
recommendations for the EPA clauses. 
 Through the research not only was it discovered GI forecasts are inaccurate and 
hence not reflective of the aircraft manufacturing industry, forecasts are consistently 
below direct labor escalation derived from FPRAs, and there are 3 historical changes in 
the average of the BLS managed actuals of PPI 336411.  These 3 results are an indication 
that basing the EPA payments on changes in forecast is bound to lead to EPA payments 
not reflective of the current market.  As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, there are 2 
types of EPA clauses, retrospective and prospective.  The most common type, 
retrospective, are written to adjust contract price by analyzing cost from a given point and 
looking back historically at what has occurred.  The less used type, prospective, are 
written to adjust contract prices in the future using forecasts.  Prospective EPAs in their 
current use are not reflective of market fluctuations.  With inaccurate forecasts of the 
price index, a retrospective EPA is more suitable.  A retrospective clause ensures there is 
no forecasting inaccuracies effecting the contingency payment, and establishes more 
appropriate parameters for an adjustment indicative of market price fluctuations.  
Therefore, for fixed price contracts with EPA, any adjustment should be based on 
changes in tracked actuals of the index rather than changes in forecasts of the index. 
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Significance of Results 
 This research provided evidence that prospective EPA clauses are based on 
inaccurate forecasts and hence are not reflective of the economy.  Utilizing a 
retrospective approach, where an established base year of the historical index is 
compared to the current year of the index to calculate the EPA, is recommended over the 
current approach.  Though the exact cost impact of this change is unclear, it is clear the 
change will result in EPA payments more reflective of current market fluctuations and 
therefore will better accomplish the EPA clause goal of providing equal protection to 
both the government and contractor in long term contracts when upward and downward 
fluctuations in the market are anticipated.  Changing to using retrospective EPA clauses 
in place of prospective EPA clauses could potentially result in more obligation authority 
being returned to the government from unwarranted or inaccurate EPAs. 
Future Research 
 The opportunity to expand on this research is prevalent in a few areas.  More EPA 
clauses should be analyzed to see if there are any trends in the way they are written for 
specific airframes.  Actual EPA calculations could be derived from multiyear contracts to 
determine the exact cost impact of current EPAs as well.  Also, other methods of 
implementing a retrospective EPA clause can be explored.  Lastly, the cost impact of 
adjusting the EPA clauses to a retrospective approach must be analyzed to see what 
potential cost savings there will be. 
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Summary 
 This research examined the efficacy of using GI forecasts as a basis of calculating 
EPA payments on fixed price contracts.  It was determined GI forecasts are inaccurate 
when compared to actuals and when compared to FPRA escalation rates.  Not only is this 
causing error in the EPA payments with regards to what is actually happening in the 
economy, but also there is a potential double payment happening as the contractor is 
assuming higher escalation than GI.  A change point analysis was then conducted and it 
was determined there were 3 historical change points in the PPI 336411 data that may be 
inhibiting the accuracy of GI forecasts.  This evidence suggested a retrospective approach 
to calculating the EPA payments was warranted over the current prospective approach.  
This was further verified as the proposed retrospective approach produced a lower MAPE 
with regards to actual PPI values compared to the GI forecasts. 
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Appendix A: EPA Clauses 
836 AESG/H025 ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT FOR NOT-TO-EXCEED (NTE) OPTION 
PRICES 
LOTS 3 - 13 (FEB 2010) 
(a) The provisions of this EPA clause provide for both price increases and decreases to protect 
the 
Government and the contractor from the effects of economic changes as specified by the indices 
and the 
bands as specified in this clause. It shall be the intent of the parties to accomplish any adjustment 
authorized by this clause prior to the exercise of Option Items subject to this clause. The 
contractor shall 
notify the Contracting Officer in writing not later than 7 calendar days prior to the scheduled 
Option 
exercise date of an Option Item (0301, 0302, 0401, 0402, 0501, 0502, 0601, 0602, 0701, 0702, 
0801, 
0802, 0901, 0902, 1001, 1002, 1101, 1102, 1201, 1202, 1301 and 1302) if an increase or 
decrease in the 
applicable Item's Not-To-Exceed (NTE) is warranted pursuant to the terms of this clause. The 
Contractor 
shall submit the Costs Subject to Adjustment (CSTA) and Costs Not Subject to Adjustment 
(CNSTA) 
amounts for each item, Aircraft and Warranty. The CSTA and the CNSTA shall be in the same 
relative 
proportion as the CSTA and the CNSTA for the proposal to definitize the NTE. The total CSTA 
plus 
CNSTA for each option item must equal the proposed NTE price calculated from Section J, 
Attachment 7 
for the Aircraft and set forth in Attachment 9, for the Warranty. The economic price adjustment for 
the 
option item NTE shall be accomplished in accordance with the procedure detailed in paragraph 
(g). The 
Contractor's proposal for an adjustment shall include supporting data, in the form required by the 
Contracting Officer, explaining the calculation; and amount of the increase or decrease. 
(b) Promptly after the Contracting Officer receives the notice and data under paragraph (a) of this 
clause, 
the Contracting Officer and the Contractor shall negotiate an adjustment to the Option Item's NTE 
amount 
and update the Option Item's NTE Aircraft unit prices in Section J, Attachment 7; and Warranty 
price in 
Section J, Attachment 9. Failure of the parties to agree on a requested adjustment under this 
clause shall 
NOT affect the Government's right to unilaterally exercise its rights pursuant to Special Contract 
Requirement H013. 
(c) Adjustments under this clause, if any, shall be based upon the formula specified in Paragraph 
(g) 
below. CSTA amounts are subject to either upward or downward adjustments. The CNSTA 
amounts 
include depreciation, cost of money, royalties, leases, data, fixed price subcontracts which do not 
contain 
EPA clauses, and profit. Proposed profit included in the NTEs shall not be subject to economic 
price 
adjustment. 
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(d) IHS Global Insight, Inc.'s index PPI336411 Aircraft (Dec 1985=100) shall be used as the 
standard of 
measurement for this clause. 
(e) The following rules shall apply in making numeric calculations under this clause: 
(1) Round decimals to 4 decimal places; 
(2) Round dollar calculations to the nearest whole dollar; 
(3) Round up numbers equal to or greater than 5; 
(4) Round down numbers less than or equal to 4; 
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(5) Round percentages to 2 decimal places (e.g. 3.47%). 
(f) For purposes of calculating the adjustments required by this clause, the following projected 
average 
annual index rates shall apply. The source of the baseline projected indices shown below is IHS 
Global 
Insight's 4th Quarter 2009 forecast. For years beyond 2019, the last data point of escalation will 
be 
projected at the same rate (straight-lined) on an annual basis through the final NTE period of 
performance. Table 1 reflects the index and the projected index based on IHS Global Insight 
PPI336411 
Aircraft (Dec 1985 = 100). 
Table 1 - Baseline Projected Average Annual Index Rates 
Projected Time Period (Dec 1985=100) 
Index Rate 
CY2015 228.9 (3.0%) 
CY2016 234.5 (2.4%) 
CY2017 238.8 (1.8%) 
CY2018 244.1 (2.2%) 
CY2019 250.1 (2.4%) 
CY2020 256.1 (2.4%) 
CY2021 262.2 (2.4%) 
CY2022 268.5 (2.4%) 
CY2023 274.9 (2.4%) 
CY2024 281.5 (2.4%) 
CY2025 288.3 (2.4%) 
CY2026 295.2 (2.4%) 
CY2027 302.3 (2.4%) 
CY2028 309.6 (2.4%) 
(g) The economic price adjustment shall be calculated as follows: 
(1) The contractor shall obtain IHS Global Insight's current projected annual index values for the 
above projected time periods. For FY NTE values, use the same CY index values, for example 
NTE FY 
2022 will use CY 2022 index values. 
(2) Divide this current projected annual index by the baseline projected average annual index rate 
identified in paragraph (f) above for that particular year; 
(3) Subtract 1 from this result and multiply the resulting answer by 100; 
(4) Adjustment for Lots 3 - 5: If the resulting value is greater than or equal to +2.5%, calculate the 
upward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed CSTA dollar amount. If the resulting 
value is 
between - 2.5% and +2.5%, do not calculate an adjustment. If the resulting value is less than or 
equal to - 
2.5%, calculate the downward adjustment by multiplying the result by the CSTA dollar value 
proposed. 
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(5) Adjustment for Lots 6 - 13: If the resulting value is greater than or equal to +1.00%, calculate 
the upward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed CSTA dollar amount. If the 
resulting 
value is between -1.00% and +1.00%, do not calculate an adjustment. If the resulting value is 
less than 
or equal to -1.00%, calculate the downward adjustment by multiplying the result by the proposed 
CSTA 
dollar value. 
(h) Notional Computation worksheet: 
Example calculation for Lots 3 - 5: 
Example 1 
CY2020 
Example 2 
CY 2020 
Example 3 
CY2020 
STEP FORMULA RESULT RESULT RESULT 
1 Global Insight's Projected Annual Index (7 days prior 
to option exercise) (Example) 
248.5 252.5 265.5 
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2 Baseline Projected Average Annual Index Rate from 
paragraph (f) Table 1 
256.1 256.1 256.1 
3 Divide Step 1 by Step 2 and round to 4 decimal 
places 
.9703 .9859 1.0367 
4* Subtract 1 from Step 3 and multiply by 100 to 
convert to % 
-2.97% -1.41% 3.67% 
5 Input applicable CSTA value for aircraft and engines 
from the annual EPA proposal 
$3.0B $3.0B 
6 Adjustment (Multiply Step 5 by Step 4) -$89.1M $110.1M 
7 Applicable NTE Price (annual EPA proposal) $3.5B $3.5B 
8 Adjusted NTE Price $3.4109B No Change $3.6101B 
* If the resulting value is between -2.50% and +2.50%, no adjustment will be calculated; 
therefore, do not 
proceed to Step 5. 
EXAMPLE 1: The EPA adjustment is a $89,100,000 decrease in the NTE Price. 
EXAMPLE 2: There is no EPA adjustment since the trigger band was not exceeded. 
EXAMPLE 3: The EPA adjustment is a $110,100,000 increase in the NTE Price. 
(i) Once an adjustment to an eligible Item's NTE amount has been accomplished under this 
clause, or a 
determination made that no adjustment is permitted pursuant to paragraph (g)(4) above, said 
Item shall 
not be subject to further Economic Price Adjustment. 
(j) In the event the IHS Global Insight Indices used are discontinued; or if IHS Global Insight 
suspends 
publication of an index identified in paragraph (d) above or significantly alters the method of 
calculating 
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the index, the parties shall agree upon an appropriate substitute index for use under this clause. If 
the 
parties cannot agree on a substitute or comparable index within 90 calendar days after an index 
has been 
discontinued or altered in method of calculation, the Contracting Officer may, acting unilaterally 
and 
subject to Contractor appeal in accordance with paragraph (k) below, either adopt the IHS Global 
Insight 
index as altered or establish a new index. 
(k) Any dispute arising under or related to the terms and/or procedures set forth in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of this contract's Disputes clause. 
(End of Clause) 
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RATIONALE FOR DETERMINATION OF CATEGORY:  Clause applies only to 
subject contract for LRIP for C-5 RERP.     
 
JUSTIFICATION:  Per SAF/AQ direction, the Contracting Officer is definitizing terms 
and conditions for Lots I through III of LRIP and is capturing Not-to-Exceed (NTE) 
prices for Lots I through VII.  Clause H-127 captures the NTE amounts for Lots I through 
VII.  It is the intent of the Parties to definitize FFP option prices for Lots I through III in 
February 2008; negotiations have been on-going through the IPT Pricing process and the 
Contractor has submitted a TINA-compliant proposal for Lots I through III.  The 
Contractor adamantly requires the attached EPA clause to afford protection from unusual 
inflation over the long-term contract for Lots IV through VII.  The clause would provide 
for adjustment only to the NTE amounts.  Definitization of FFP prices for each lot then 
would be based on TINA-compliant proposals.  The Contractor has a long-term 
arrangement with the engine supplier for all lots and the arrangement includes provisions 
for EPA as established in Clause H-125 of subject contract.  The clause indicates that it is 
not anticipated that the FFP prices, once definitized, would be subject to further EPA 
with the exception for the engines.  The clause states, however, that should it be 
determined during negotiations of definitive FFP amounts that further EPA is required, 
the FFP as adjusted shall not exceed the established NTE amounts. It is noted that the 
NTE amounts cited within the clause are subject to further review by the 716 AESG.  
Changes to the text of the clause, however, are not anticipated absent further direction 
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during the review and clearance process.  A separate determination and finding will be 
accomplished as required by FAR to document use of this EPA clause. 
 
Communication concerning the negotiation of this clause is documented at Attachment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
The undersigned contracting officer has determined that the attached clause language 
does not duplicate or deviate from the FAR and FAR Supplements and is necessary for 
use in the subject contractual document. 
 
 
____________________________________________  __________________________ 
VICKI A. FRY            DATE 
Contracting Officer  
716 AESG 
255-1054 
 
_____________________________________________  __________________________ 
Legal Office Coordination     Date 
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CLAUSE: 
 
H128 ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT (EPA) FOR LOTS 4 – 7 NOT-TO-
EXCEED PRICES (Jan 2008) 
 
(a) The Lot 4 through 7 Not-to-Exceed (NTE) prices established at H-127, NTE Prices 
(Jan 2008), shall be adjusted to account for abnormal fluctuations in costs, as measured 
at the national level and reflected in the indexes identified in paragraph (c) below.  Such  
adjustments, if any, shall be based upon the formula specified in paragraph (f) below.  
The NTE prices are subject only to upward adjustments. Prior to definitization of each 
lot, adjustments to the NTEs will, if necessary, be made in accordance with this clause.  
 
(b) Of the NTE prices specified at H-127, economic adjustments determined under this 
clause apply to the NTE amounts, less the GE propulsion system, for priced labor and 
materials  (as identified in tables 1, 2 & 3).  EPA adjustments for GE propulsion system 
and spares are covered in contract clause H-125, Economic Price Adjustment for Engine 
(Jan 2008).  Prior to the definitization dates, the Contractor shall submit a proposal, 
compliant with the Truth in Negotiations Act, to support definitization of each effort; 
such proposal(s) shall constitute the basis for negotiation of fair and reasonable Firm 
Fixed Prices for each option at less than or equal to the specified NTE amounts.  It is the 
intent of the Parties that Firm Fixed Prices for Lots 4 through 7, upon definitization, shall 
not be subject to further Economic Price Adjustment except for that specified in Clause 
H-125. If it is necessary to include EPA provisions in Firm Fixed Prices for Lots 4 
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through 7 upon definitization, the extent to which the FFP is adjustable shall not exceed 
the NTE amount for each lot as determined through this clause at time of definitization.  
 
Table 1 - Labor and related NTE Amounts for Installation for CY2013-CY2016 
subject to EPA 
CLIN(s) CY13 CY14 CY15 CY16
4004 134,300,000$     
5004 188,900,000$     
6004 189,200,000$     
7004 200,800,000$      
 
 
Table 2 - Material and related NTE Amounts for Long Lead and 
Material/Fabrication effort  by CLIN for CY2011-CY2015 subject to EPA  
 
Effort CY10 CY11 CY12 CY13 CY14
Lot 4 Long-Lead 106,200,000$       
Lot 4 Material/Fabrication 317,600,000$       
Lot 5 Long Lead 163,600,000$       
Lot 5 Material/Fabrication 503,000,000$       
Lot 6 Long Lead 171,900,000$       
Lot 6 Material/Fabrication 530,000,000$       
Lot 7 Long Lead 172,400,000$       
Lot 7 Material/Fabrication 540,700,000$       
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Table 3 - Spares and Support Equipment (less GE Propulsion System and GE 
Propulsion Spares) 
Effort CY11 CY12 CY13 CY14
Lot 4 Spares 44,100,000$       
Lot 4 SE 11,162,000$       
Lot 5 Spares 60,000,000$       
Lot 5 SE 17,110,000$       
Lot 6 Spares 59,900,000$       
Lot 6 SE 8,911,000$         
Lot 7 Spares 73,700,000$       
Lot 7 SE -$                     
(c) Global Insight’s forecasted indices shall be used as the standard of measurement for 
this clause. 
 
(1) The index used for calculations of this clause for Table 1 above is Global Insight’s 
index for ECIPWAIRNS, Wgs & Sal, Private, Aircraft Mfg (2005:4=100).   
 
(2) The index used for calculations of this clause for Table 2 and 3 above is  Global 
Insight’s index for WPIPIND, PPI Industrial Commodities (1982=100).   
 
(d) The following rules shall apply in making numeric calculations under this clause: 
 
(1) Round decimals to 3 decimal places; 
(2) Round dollar calculations to the nearest whole dollar; 
(3) Round up numbers equal to or greater than 5; 
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(4) Round down numbers less than or equal to 4; 
(5) Round percentages to 4 decimal places (e.g. 3.47%). 
 
(e)  For purposes of calculating the adjustments required by this clause, the following 
projected average index rates shall apply.  The source of the projected indexes shown 
below is Global Insight’s 3rd Quarter 2007 Forecast.  Table 1 reflects the projected 
indexes for ECIPWAIRNS, Wgs & Sal, Private, Aircraft Mfg (2005:4=100).  Table 2 
& 3 reflects the projected indexes for WPIPIND, PPI Industrial Commodities 
(1982=100). 
 
 
 
Projected Time Period 
 
Table 1  
 (2005:4=100) 
Index Rate 
 
Table 2 & 3 
 (1982=100) 
Index Rate 
CY2011 118.3 178.2 
CY2012 122.0 180.0 
CY2013 125.9 182.2 
CY2014 129.9 184.4 
CY2015 134.1 186.9 
CY2016 138.4 189.4 
 
(f) The economic price adjustment shall be calculated as follows:   
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(1) Determine the twelve month index average for a particular year by summing the 
twelve Global Insight monthly values and dividing by twelve. 
 
(2) Divide this  twelve month index average by the forecasted index rate identified 
in paragraph (e) above for that particular year;  
 
(3) Subtract 1 from this result and multiply the resulting answer by 100;   
 
(4) If the absolute value of the result is greater than 2.0%, calculate the adjustment 
by multiplying the result by the appropriate dollar value set out in the applicable 
Table 1 and Table 2; if the absolute value of the result is less than or equal to 
2.0%, do not calculate an adjustment.   
 
(g)  Notional Computation worksheet:  
 
Example 1 Example 2
CY 2011 CY 2011
Step Formula Result Result
(1) Projected Labor Index rate from paragraph (e) Table 1 118.30 118.30
(2) Forcased Labor 12 month index average rate (example) 116.056 121.151
(3) Divide Step (2) by Step (1) and round to 3 decimals 0.981 1.024
  (4)* Subtract 1 from Step (3) and multiply by 100 to convert to % -1.90% 2.40%
(5) Input NTE Price for Labor & Related from Table 1 (example value) 200,000$    
(6) Multiply Step (5) by Step (4) -$           4,800$        
(7) Adjustment with 2% trigger band -$           4,800$        
* If the absolute value of the result is less than or equal to 2.00%, no adjustment
   will be calculated; therefore, do not proceed to step (5). 
 Example 1:  There is no EPA adjustment since the trigger band was not exceeded. 
84 
Example 2:  The EPA adjustment is a $4,800 increase in the NTE Price. 
 
(h)  In the event the Global Insight Indices used are discontinued or if Global Insight 
suspends publication of an index identified in paragraph (c) above or significantly alters 
the method of calculating the index, the parties shall agree upon an appropriate 
substitute for the discontinued or altered index for use under this clause.  If the parties 
cannot agree on a substitute or comparable index (or cannot agree as to whether the 
alteration to the index is “significant”) within 90 calendar days after an index has been 
discontinued or altered in method of calculation, the Contracting Officer may, acting 
unilaterally and subject to Contractor appeal in accordance with paragraph (i) below, 
either adopt the Global Insight  index as altered or establish a new index. 
 
(i)  Any dispute arising under or related to the terms and/or procedures set forth in the 
foregoing paragraphs shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of this 
contract’s Disputes clause. 
 
(End of clause) 
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Appendix B: Contractor FPRA Escalation Rates and GI Forecast Deviation Graphs 
Contractor Escalation Rates 
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Global Insight Forecast Deviation from FPRA Rates Graphs 
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